Another thing that I’d like to clarify is that this hip does not refer to the role of content creator in the comm channels cited, that would be responsability of the corresponding managers of that channel.
The main idea looks good but to make it practical it’d be good to allow elected people to nominate delegates (as otherwise only famous people can get elected and they are probably not the ones with that much time to manage and the DAO would deprive itself of some communication workforce).
- Why would anyone “without much time to manage and the DAO” would postulate themselves to be an admin?
- Why wouldn’t the delegates candidate themselves?
- Why couldn’t the “famous people” vouch for them in a candidacy?
It would be like electing for President and then the President elects someone else to run a country, not very democratic IMHO.
Admins and communication roles are not places of high power. For example at Kleros there are a bunch of people working for the cooperative having access. It would mean that every-time someone new comes or someone leaves, there would need to be a new vote.
As an example today we got some moderator coming at Kleros who is doing its trial period, she works on moderating Kleros and Kleros-linked channels including Proof Of Humanity. If the proposal was passed, she would not be able to moderate.
Decentralization is great, but asking people to vote on everything (even trivial stuff like adding a moderator) every time is gonna lead to voter fatigue and cluttering of the snapshot interface (there would be ways to avoid that with more complex liquid voting interfaces allowing to delegate on specific topics but snapshot is not at that point yet).
Also note that people who are admin could anyways give access to other people.
There seems to be a term confusion between what a moderator does and what an admin does. The HIP does not cover the role of moderator, it covers the role for admin, and it is precisely defined in the HIP itself:
Granting access, banning or muting users is a place of high power because of exactly this.
Kleyr could then offer herself to be elected for the role at PoH, or continue her role as a moderator. There is a non-issue, then. The same goes for content creation, as mentioned before.
If voting fatigue is an issue, we could change the role duration enough so it does not fatigue voters.
99% of the banning is about spam and I don’t believe it to be a place of high power. If you want to avoid censorship, you could simply clarify that any ban dispute is to be handled by the elected individuals and not their delegates.
Well it would first take 2 weeks to do so which would by itself eat half of the trial period. Really we shouldn’t put ourselves some difficulties like that preventing the DAO to function in a lean manner.
The DAO should be practical and be able to run as fast as centralized projects can. Asking simple positions like moderator to be elected while prevented elected people to delegate their moderation power goes against that.
Well the first election on the platform itself would be very vulnerable to Sybil attacks which for an anti-Sybil project would look quite bad. So I believe this should be removed too.
That’s also an issue. I believe the DAO should be able to terminate elected positions at any time and without any reason. Here some people may not be suited to being moderators as a general unfitness for the task even if they haven’t done any “serious offense”.
Overall the proposal looks made with good attentions but to be “Governance over-engineering”.
Granted, I’ve updated the text so it is through snapshot poll only.
By whose authority?
Por mi experiencia laboral puedo decir que la parte más esencial de un producto , es el primer contacto con el adquirente (nuevo usuario) ,parece correcto que sea ordenado por su gov ,
cuales son :
agravios graves .
y ante alguna falta , sería necesario una interconsulta entre los administradores , crear un grupo de administradores por ej .
Creo que es una necesidad, lo que parece burocracia, quizá solo sea responsabilidad democrática en el contacto con los nuevos miembros .
Daria mucha seriedad a la comunidad , ya que los grupos , se convirtieron en oficiales con todo lo que eso implica .
forma de elección de los administradores y claro su forma de remoción . parece una pavada pero ninguna multinacional elige a sus vendedores/representantes a dedo ,todos pasan por una entrevista .
También entiendo que hoy todo esto se realiza por el solo hecho de ayudar y los administradores de los grupos que he visitado son excelentes y democráticos pese a eso no seria mala idea quede esto regulado para un futuro
From my work experience I can say that the most essential part of a product is the first contact with the acquirer (new user), it seems correct that it is ordered by your gov,
and in the event of any fault, it would be necessary to consult the administrators, create a group of administrators for example.
I think it is a necessity, what seems like bureaucracy, perhaps it is only a democratic responsibility in contacting the new members.
It would give the community a lot of seriousness, since the groups became officers with all that that implies.
form of election of the administrators and clear their form of removal. It seems silly but no multinational company selects its salespeople / representatives by hand, they all go through an interview.
I also understand that today all this is done for the sole fact of helping and the administrators of the groups that I have visited are excellent and democratic, despite that it would not be a bad idea to be regulated for the future
Hi all! Here’s a related proposal to create a minimal Code of Conduct for our Telegram channels! Looking forward to your input over there.
@paulaberman HAY COSAS A TENER EN CUENTA EN LOS GRUPOS OFICIALES .
THERE ARE THINGS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IN OFFICIAL GROUPS
I applaud another great initiative being spearheaded by @ludovico!
One concern I have is jurisdiction and the definition of generally regarded as official. Is it in the power of this DAO to take an account created by a private individual? You mention Telegram groups, but what groups? There are many. At what point is a group considered GRAO? I guess GRAO could be defined as linked to on the main website. And to qualify for linking you have to turn ownership over to the DAO.
I agree with @clesaege regarding voter fatigue. Administration and moderation of communities is tiresome and fast paced. Having to put every change through the full democratic process would be like asking a city to run an election and vote for every city employee. If a Twitter admin goes rouge and starts posting damaging content, imagine the days required to get a binding vote to remove them.
I propose an alternative: Grant the power for the elected mission board to assign/remove moderators and admins of all official channels. Treat them like cabinet positions. The community still has a democratic recourse by changing the mission board.
Thank you, @Justin , your feedback is always welcome and most on point.
Ownership ≠ content creation ≠ content moderation ≠ admin roles.
I took the term “generally regarded as official” from the term “generally regarded as safe” from the food industry, meaning that there is a consensus from members that it is the one where things are being discussed. Linking it from the project website does not make it more or less official.
Never implied to “take the account from a private individual”. I meant that there would be an agreement from the channel owner and the DAO to cooperate by allowing them to have that specific role elected. For example, I own the subreddit and the portuguese telegram group, the vote and polls channels, the manual channel, and I’d really love to have someone from the community itself to be enforcing actions. Having that level of interlocking with the dao and community will give credibility to the channel itself, and at the same time promote new self-assembled groups and channels (like crowdfunder and crowdvoucher groups). This prevents the “if you don’t like it, go create your own channel” situation, or cases in which there is room for a potential authoritarian intent from the top to monopolize opinion. In summary it would be in the best interest of the owners of the channel to allow some degree of autonomy and decentralization.
The sole purpose of the HIP is for admin roles, and it has been defined in the HIP itself. The mission board keeps (and should) have control over the rest.
First, it is not every change that this proposal encompasses, which is an argument devoid of validity, since the proposal is not saying that, and like the 352, there is no intent to go further down the road.
As for the city example, a better analogy would be places in which each of the branches of power are elected separately (judicial, law-enforcement, administration). So the best analogy I see here is how certain communities choose their law enforcement officials based on their trust and reputation in that community (like modern-day sheriffs in small US communities). Dropping a role like that from a central authority (as its been happening so far) doesn’t sound like promoting plurality of voices. It is the exact role that you want the most to be elected independently from the top management.
Yeah I think this sums up my concerns well.
I disagree on the amount of power of moderators, the job is mostly removing spam and heinous content, it’s very far from being one of the 3 powers (judicial, legislative and executive), it’s just a simple function of an executive.
But if you think so, you could modify your proposal to make it practical by allowing elected individuals to delegate the management of communication platforms as they see fit. This would solve your concerns while keeping it practical and not reducing the amount of work put in POH.
Thanks for the feedback
That modification would not change the current situation, in which this delegation occurs without participation nor representation of public interest. It would nullify any effect that the HIP is willing to change.
It would, as people handling the (almost as the ultimate is the DAO) ultimate decisions about com channels would be elected, thus responsible in front of the DAO.
If the proposal is mainly about preventing people to delegate daily tasks without involving a DAO vote, in this case I would oppose and vote against it.
I’ve considered your comments, and to avoid voting fatigue or decisions on daily tasks, the elections should be done in a 6-month period, which is a reasonable frequency and it does not lead to fatigue from the voters. Having enough discussion in this matters, I consider this proposal as ready to move to Phase 2.
I’m not convinced there should be an “officially regarded channel” by the DAO. I’d prefer having different competing channels that people can join based on the service they provide. Such as different newspapers with different editorial lines in a democratic society.
At most, there could be a list of suggested channels by the DAO, with some minimal curation (eg., making sure the channel isn’t a scam) that could be provided by some decentralized tool such as Kleros Curate.
In any case, I think this discussion is very far removed from the current concerns about the project and we shouldn’t spend any attention and energy on this at the moment.
If people still think it’s important, I think this could be discussed at a later moment.
This thread was closed and the discussion moved to phase 2 four days ago. Now the proposal Passed phase 2 and is in Phase 3.