I applaud another great initiative being spearheaded by @ludovico!
One concern I have is jurisdiction and the definition of generally regarded as official. Is it in the power of this DAO to take an account created by a private individual? You mention Telegram groups, but what groups? There are many. At what point is a group considered GRAO? I guess GRAO could be defined as linked to on the main website. And to qualify for linking you have to turn ownership over to the DAO.
I agree with @clesaege regarding voter fatigue. Administration and moderation of communities is tiresome and fast paced. Having to put every change through the full democratic process would be like asking a city to run an election and vote for every city employee. If a Twitter admin goes rouge and starts posting damaging content, imagine the days required to get a binding vote to remove them.
I propose an alternative: Grant the power for the elected mission board to assign/remove moderators and admins of all official channels. Treat them like cabinet positions. The community still has a democratic recourse by changing the mission board.
I took the term âgenerally regarded as officialâ from the term âgenerally regarded as safeâ from the food industry, meaning that there is a consensus from members that it is the one where things are being discussed. Linking it from the project website does not make it more or less official.
Never implied to âtake the account from a private individualâ. I meant that there would be an agreement from the channel owner and the DAO to cooperate by allowing them to have that specific role elected. For example, I own the subreddit and the portuguese telegram group, the vote and polls channels, the manual channel, and Iâd really love to have someone from the community itself to be enforcing actions. Having that level of interlocking with the dao and community will give credibility to the channel itself, and at the same time promote new self-assembled groups and channels (like crowdfunder and crowdvoucher groups). This prevents the âif you donât like it, go create your own channelâ situation, or cases in which there is room for a potential authoritarian intent from the top to monopolize opinion. In summary it would be in the best interest of the owners of the channel to allow some degree of autonomy and decentralization.
The sole purpose of the HIP is for admin roles, and it has been defined in the HIP itself. The mission board keeps (and should) have control over the rest.
First, it is not every change that this proposal encompasses, which is an argument devoid of validity, since the proposal is not saying that, and like the 352, there is no intent to go further down the road.
As for the city example, a better analogy would be places in which each of the branches of power are elected separately (judicial, law-enforcement, administration). So the best analogy I see here is how certain communities choose their law enforcement officials based on their trust and reputation in that community (like modern-day sheriffs in small US communities). Dropping a role like that from a central authority (as its been happening so far) doesnât sound like promoting plurality of voices. It is the exact role that you want the most to be elected independently from the top management.
I disagree on the amount of power of moderators, the job is mostly removing spam and heinous content, itâs very far from being one of the 3 powers (judicial, legislative and executive), itâs just a simple function of an executive.
But if you think so, you could modify your proposal to make it practical by allowing elected individuals to delegate the management of communication platforms as they see fit. This would solve your concerns while keeping it practical and not reducing the amount of work put in POH.
That modification would not change the current situation, in which this delegation occurs without participation nor representation of public interest. It would nullify any effect that the HIP is willing to change.
It would, as people handling the (almost as the ultimate is the DAO) ultimate decisions about com channels would be elected, thus responsible in front of the DAO.
If the proposal is mainly about preventing people to delegate daily tasks without involving a DAO vote, in this case I would oppose and vote against it.
Iâve considered your comments, and to avoid voting fatigue or decisions on daily tasks, the elections should be done in a 6-month period, which is a reasonable frequency and it does not lead to fatigue from the voters. Having enough discussion in this matters, I consider this proposal as ready to move to Phase 2.
Iâm not convinced there should be an âofficially regarded channelâ by the DAO. Iâd prefer having different competing channels that people can join based on the service they provide. Such as different newspapers with different editorial lines in a democratic society.
At most, there could be a list of suggested channels by the DAO, with some minimal curation (eg., making sure the channel isnât a scam) that could be provided by some decentralized tool such as Kleros Curate.
In any case, I think this discussion is very far removed from the current concerns about the project and we shouldnât spend any attention and energy on this at the moment.
If people still think itâs important, I think this could be discussed at a later moment.