This court is mannaged by 10 wallets, it is very higly concentrated. This is one of the main reason we want to chage the arbitrator parameters and include UBI instead of PNK. Give to the POH community the poewr to mange his own registry.
A better comparison in the context of Proof Of Humanity would be the repartitions of voting power in the Humanity Court which looks like this:
GM santisiri, I have questions regarding conflict of interests.
You are the founder of UBI and a significant holder. Currently you publicly hold 295k UBI, you are the biggest active voter on the UBI DAO and you also have the biggest amount of delegations on POH. Do you have any significant amount of UBI in anon accounts? If yes, would you reveal how much for the sake of transparency?
I also remember when an anon UBI whale who was an early democracy earth investor dumped UBIs last year. Are there still democracy earth “investors” holding significant amounts of UBI around? If yes, how much and what is your relationship with them?
I was trying to check what the UBI DAO vote power distribution is and surprisingly I might have found something concerning (notice that you should be comparing PNK vs UBI, not PNK vs POH, which is dishonest). If you look at the last Snapshot poll, it is quite evident that there is something rigged. Those values are not square roots of UBI, not even with delegation, and you have more than 50% of the voting power. I don’t understand what is exactly wrong there. Maybe UBIVOTE is broken or the UBI snapshot space that you manage is corrupted. Not surprisingly, many supporters of this proposal also voted with a corrupted amount of UBIVOTE. Please clarify what is happening ASAP.
On the other hand, during the Mission Board elections, which you won by a big margin, you said that you didn’t vote in order to let the community speak louder. Taking into account that there are some conflict of interest concerns, would you also abstain from voting HIP 49 to let humans speak louder?
Lastly, let me say that this proposal seems like a trap to me. It copies the bad of Kleros and makes it worse. Even with quadratic, human votes, UBI Kleros courts will still be a stake system. If you are interested in a fully democratic system, maybe we should start heading in the direction of more democracy instead of insisting in staking systems: [Phase 1] HIP-47: Democratic submissions and removals.
I can argue that the people who develop and study 24/7 through several years are in better position to suggest the court parameters rather than a lot of people who don’t understand how the arbitrable works. But again, i would like to see how this experiment goes. Maybe in that way all this people that think that make an arbitrator reliable it’s easy will find out that it’s very very hard.
How decentralized it’s the UBI DAO?, because if the new arbitrator will rely on UBI, we should compare UBI against PNK instead of PNK - PoH. There are corporate with CTOs, CEOs holding UBI? How will this impact in the arbitator?
I don’t hold any other UBI than the one you can see on my public account santi.eth
To my knowledge there are no significant investors from the UBI regulated pre-sale that we did in 2018.
Yes, we realized that the delegator plugin was pointing to UBI instead of UBIVOTE. This was an honest mistake and it was fixed right away. Fortunately the only UIP affected by it was one that had 99% of support. Shouldn’t happen again. Apologies for any confusion regarding this.
I have a right to represent my delegates and humans already spoke very loud during the mission board election, so expect my vote to be cast with conviction.
I will check HIP 47, thanks for sharing.
To my knowledge, there are some CEOs holding UBI like Marcos Galperin, but it’s not a significant amount. He accrues like any other ordinary human
The biggest holder of UBI to date is Vitalik Buterin and you can check this on Etherscan, with 1.8M UBI
Actually this isn’t the case (but it’s probably an honest mistake as simply looking on etherscan doesn’t show tokens in pools, I advise using debank for this purpose).
The largest UBI wallet belongs to the cooperative with 2.1M UBI (we removed those from the pool for transparency).
Note that the Cooperative didn’t get any UBI allocation, it bought those to provide liquidity and in order to finance the DAO. We bought for 150k$ of UBI (worth 7k$ today) from the DAO and the remaining passively as a liquidity provider.
I think it could be interesting for voters to know:
Could you further explain what this means?
The initial supply consisted of 10M UBI of which 4M where allocated to the DAO, 4M to the liquidity farming contract and 2M to the pre-sale investors and community.
$1.2M in 2018 valuating each UBI at $1.25
100% - We are a 501 (c) 3 not for profit corporation, we don’t do equity or dividends, everything is invested.
From the raise, Democracy Earth has invested it all in the R&D that led to the launch of UBI between 2018 and 2021 which includes projects with the Ethereum ecosystem (eg. MolochDAO smart contract), implementation of pilots (eg. Quadratic Voting in Colorado in collaboration with Glen Weyl et al.), participation in conferences (eg. Devcon in Prague and Osaka where we met to brainstorm Proof of Hymanity) and published papers (eg. “Who Watches The Watchmen”)
330K UBI, never sold.
It should be clarified that Kleros bought UBI to the Proof of Humanity DAO, not to Democracy Earth. The ETH from that transaction is in the DAO treasury and you can vote on how to allocate it.
The allocation of UBI is not a deal since there are some ideas that involve only DRIPPED $UBI to play the role that $PNK plays today.
(I still do not know if that is technically possible, but i’m aware of the discussion)
Additionally, jurors may be asked to be verified humans. Another possible upgrade to the current model.
So is it really pertinent the $UBI distribution?
Antes de exponer mi idea deseo aclarar por lo declarado por el Sr. Clement es que no comparto y no me parece adecuado mezclar en este hilo la HIP48 y Hip49 dado que las dos representan propósitos diferentes y a su vez están realizadas por autores diferentes.
Como parte de la comunidad hispanohablante expondré mi idea en castellano (usemos traductor)
Sito lo expuesto por Santi y que comparto “La complejidad de la implementación no debería impedirnos expresar lo que queremos representar como DAO… “ los autores de esta HIP hemos sido críticos del arbitrador en todos los debates que se han llevado a cabo en los grupos de Telegram y más en el de POH en Español, algunos lo han expuesto de manera más pasional que otros pero con la visión en común.
Debo asumir que mi conocimiento sobre lo técnico se los dejo a los especialistas, soy analfabeta en ese campo, sin embargo eso no me inhabilita para reconocer que los objetivos que persigue la Comunidad de POH no está alineada a los intereses del arbitrador, es relevante recalcar que el governor de nuestro arbitrador lo maneja una empresa privada . Y frente a ese escenario nada nos impide tomar el control de nuestro destino, a la descentralización. Seguramente el camino no será fácil pero tampoco imposible. Reconozco en algunos comentarios un alto grado de amenaza y una forma de instalar miedo, herramienta utilizada muchas veces como arma de dominación política y control social.
Seguramente este es un momento histórico como DAO para ver si las decisiones que no se alinean a los intereses de Kleros son capaces de prosperar dentro de POH, reconocer que tan descentralizados estamos y parafraseando a Santi reconocer“Si somos un proyecto propiedad de kleros o un proyecto libre”
This proposal is about using UBI, so that is definitely pertinent.
And if you want jurors to be humans that could be done in the future via a custom Kleros V2 module.
Pero, ¿podrían encontrar un caso en el que Kleros no dictaminara de acuerdo con las reglas?
En realidad, en su mayoría han estado criticando las reglas, pero debido a que las reglas las decide el DAO, no pueden criticarse a sí mismos y trataron de usar a Kleros como chivo expiatorio.
But could they find one case where Kleros didn’t rule according to the rules?
Actually they have mostly been criticizing the rules, but because the rules are decided by the DAO, they can’t criticize themselves and tried to get Kleros as a scapegoat.
Esto es falso, el gobernador de Kleros es el DAO de Kleros, no la Cooperativa (y la cooperativa es, como su nombre lo indica, una cooperativa a la que cualquier usuario, incluidos los usuarios de PoH, puede unirse).
This is false, the governor of Kleros is the Kleros DAO, not the Cooperative (and the cooperative is as its name indicates a cooperative that any user, including PoH users can join).
There is a long list of cases where there was an inconsistency between the written rule and what was actually happening.
There is constant overshooting and abuse of the written law, that is beyond an underspecification of the metaevidence.
To begin with the pie charts checks all the boxes of what is considered a really “ugly visualization” Pie Charts in Data Visualization- Good, Bad or Ugly? Them being:
The best representation of the juror staking distibution is one that you have a clear distinction of how many wallets belong to a specific range of stake, and lumping them together as a way to summarize the available information.
This is the plot that actually reveals some information (and funny enough, it was repeatedly flagged as “misleading”). It shows the amount of stakers per level of staking, and the number in blue represent the amount of stakers within each category.
There is not to much to say that there are currently only 36 wallets occupying more than 3/4s of the humanity court, while 164 take the rest of the seats.
Moreover, it is the view of Kleros’ CTO says publicly that this level of concentration is a good thing to have, because supposedly he considers a high concentration at courts (like him occupying more than 50% of the stake of Technical court) a way of the “good jurors” set the “good criteria” (whatever good or bad is in this case, and in the context of game theory).
Also, Clement himself recognizes that “bank attacks” could happen in a Kleros court, in which regular registered Humans would be helpless to defend themselves, because even with the possibility of crowdfound an appeal, no one has enough time or resources to gather that amount of funds, especially when the perception of concentration and bias in the court is incredibly high.
The “whataboutist” comparison with ethereum mining is first, not relevant since we are not talking about mining or not even governance, and second very tangent to what we are talking about which is access to the right of participation in the justice process of our own DAO.
Let me add also what the criteria of what the high standards of one of the Kleros DAO leader has over what he considers what a “good court” is:
Could you give links to those? Maybe you disagree on some edge cases, but the rules were always applied. If you believe the way to handle some edgecase is bad, you can make a proposal to modify the rules to specify the edge case and this would not be an edgecase anymore.
This pie chart is highly confusing and you know it. I showed this chart and asked people how many people were required to get the majority and they all said 3 (which is wrong). This pie chart is grouping all wallets with similar staking size together while the chart I gave is objective row data.
That isn’t true, I said that initially to bootstrap courts good functioning it was good for large stakeholders to stake, but that overtime courts should decentralize and the Humanity court was a good example of that.
Again, taking my messages out of context. This is an answer to the idea of allowing an unlimited amount of appeals. So yeah, in a hypothetical version of Kleros with an unlimited number of appeals, you could have bank attacks, that’s why there is a limited number of appeal of in Kleros, thus Kleros is protected from bank attacks.
It is not “whataboutism”, I’m a huge supporter of Ethereum. The comparison is only to show what people consider decentralized.
I don’t see anything wrong with that, do you mean you want stupid people to rule on cases?
Here I’m pointing the importance of initial conditions for Schelling games. Since jurors are incentivized to rule according to the final ruling, if they know that the court is mainly composed of clever people, they should do it in a clever way, but if it were composed of stupid people, even clever jurors would have to rule in a stupid way to be coherent with them.
These are just your subjective opinions. In PoH you will find 16k slightly different opinions on how to rule disputes with any given policy. For example, in my case, I disagree with 4 out of the 5 points you mentioned, but I still recognize that there are reasonable arguments on the other side of the discussion. As it has been said and done many times, the good thing is that PoH can adjust the rules if there is democratic consensus that a case should have been ruled differently. So far, some of those adjustments were aligned with your believes (360p quality), some others not (black & white pics).
With your rationale (thinking that there is only one right way of interpreting subjectivities in the policy), there is no arbitrator that will ever fit your wishes. Not even the Kleros-UBI fork. I recommend you waiting for Kleros v2 and setting up a “Ludoviko Module Subcourt” where you can be the single, qualified juror and rule according to your believes.
Talking about stake distributions… It may be counter-intuitive, but even a Ludoviko Subcourt would be decentralized if it can be immediately appealed to a Humanity Subcourt. Decentralization is not a picture.
Let me ask you some questions:
Don’t get me wrong, I don’t think Kleros courts are perfect (no court will be perfect). Here are some of the improvements that I’d like to see (and none of them is about the distribution of stakes of a given court at a given time):
In my opinion, UBI courts will be just another low quality fork of Kleros.
Esto no es una lucha personal, no es @clesaege vs @ludovico no tiene nada que ver con la HIP de Luis ni con la moderación de Clement. Ese argumento no solo es una falacia, sino que además es una sub-estimación hacia los firmantes de la HIP y de muchos colaboradores de la DAO.
Poh DAO está en un momento de crecimiento, donde quiere y necesita poder tomar decisiones que estén cada vez mas alineadas con sus objetivos y no tener una coop como Kleros con la última palabra sobre su autonomía.
Los intereses de Kleros DAO y de Poh DAO no son 100% los mismos, pueden tener puntos de alineamiento, pero mientras Kleros busca darle valor al PNK y en caso que esto este alineado con ese objetivo, valorizar el UBI. Poh DAO busca darle valor y uso al UBI incluso cuando esto pueda ir en contra del valor del PNK.
El objetivo de esta HIP#49 es que las decisiones últimas de Poh DAO no estén necesariamente superditadas a los objetivos de Kleros, para eso se propone el cambio de Arbitrator y por consiguiente de Governor.
Porque la autonomía basada en humanos no puede ni debe estar superditada en ultima instancia a la autonomia Plutocrática de algunas wallets, y si eso ocurriera que se tenga la autonomía de corregirlo pronto.
Porque en estos 16 meses de vida se demostró que la justicia utilizada para activos o casos financieros no siempre funciona cuando lo que se está arbitrando son humanos.
Porque no se puede pensar que el desarrollo de Poh es de Kleros, que si bien pagó muchos de los recursos, el trabajo incansable y ad-honorem de la comunidad fue la fuerza vital que lo trajo hasta donde está. [^3]
Porque el whitepaper de Kleros [^1] lo contempla como alternativa, e incluso se describe como un atributo.
Kleros tiene mucho para ganar con esta decision, si este experimiento es exitoso está probando que el punto 4.9 de su white paper es aplicable, esto no solo no disminuye su valor en el mediano plazo, ciertamente lo aumenta. Tener un camino de salida claro y probado puede acelerar la toma de decisiones de quienes estén pensado en usarlo y Kleros va a encontrar más casos de uso que antes.
El camino de la independencia no es un camino facil, pero estoy convencido que es un paso necesario.
Jfdominguez.eth
Automatic translation
This is not a personal fight, it is not Clement vs Luis, it has nothing to do with Luis’ HIP nor Clement’s moderation. That argument is not only a fallacy, it is also an underestimation towards the HIP signatories and many DAO contributors.
Poh DAO is in a moment of growth, where wants and needs to be able to take decisions that are increasingly aligned with its goals and not have a coop like Kleros with the final say on its autonomy.
The interests of Kleros DAO and Poh DAO are not 100% the same, they may have points of alignment, but while Kleros seeks to give value to the PNK and in case this is aligned with that objective, to value the UBI. Poh DAO seeks to give value and use to the UBI even when this may go against the value of the PNK.
The objective of this HIP#49 is that the ultimate decisions of Poh DAO are not necessarily superceded to the objectives of Kleros, for that the change of Arbitrator and consequently of Governor is proposed.
Because the human-based autonomy cannot and should not be ultimately superceded to the Plutocratic autonomy of some wallets, and if that were to happen, to have the autonomy to correct it soon.
Because in these 16 months of life it was demonstrated that the justice used for assets or financial cases does not always work when what is being arbitrated are humans.
Because it cannot be thought that the development of Poh is Kleros’, that although he paid for many of the resources, the tireless and ad-honorem work of the community was the vital force that brought it to where it is. [^3]
Because the Kleros whitepaper [^1] contemplates it as an alternative, and it is even described as an attribute.
Kleros has a lot to gain with this decision, if this experiment is successful it is proving that point 4.9 of its white paper is applicable, this not only does not diminish its value in the medium term, it certainly increases it. Having a clear and proven exit path can accelerate decision making for those who are thinking of using it, and Kleros is going to find more use cases than before.
The road to independence is not an easy one, but I am convinced that it is a necessary step.
Jfdominguez.eth
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
[^1]: Kleros White Paper https://kleros.io/whitepaper_long_en.pdf We envisage writing arbitrable contracts in such a way that, with unanimous consent of the concerned parties, an arbitrator for an existing contract can be replaced with a fork of Kleros
[^2]: En el siguiente gráfico provisto por Clement se puede ver la distribución de PNK en wallets. multiples Wallets pueden pertenecer a una misma persona. 15 wallets concentran más del 51% del poder de voto en Kleros DAO
En estos gráficos se puedn ver la distribución de los votos de las 2 DAOs en Snapshot
[^3]: crowdfunders, crowdvouchers, chequeo de perfiles, más de 30 Comunity calls, canales de discusión en Telegram, canales de discusión en Discord, encuentros presenciales, UBI-Burner, Nueva UI, miles de horas de soporte y tantos otros.
[^4]: [Phase 1] HIP #49 Change of Arbitrator - #29 by santisiri
What we are talking about is to have the Arbitrator and Governor full aligned to Poh DAO, we are not talking about one case or one court neither about @ludovico wills.
“Whoever controls the courts, controls the state”. Aristotle. This is how Kleros white paper introduction starts. Personally I want a court controlled by diverse humans with alligned interesses and not by 10-15 wallets with some other motivations.
I wish a inclusive register where attaks and mistakes are not trated as the same, and the answer “you allways can change the rules” is what started this HIP.
At this moment my intention is not to improve Kleros is to have independence across all instances for Poh DAO. To Improve democracy by having more humans as jurors without any other interesses than UBI. To have an Arbitrator ruled by UBI, an inflationary token currently supplying 11M/month with the fairest distribution system so far.
PoH paid a total of 10 000$ to jurors, that is less than 1$ per registration. Putting UBI as a staking token will not significantly increase UBI price.
The fork explained in the whitepaper is forking in case of malicious decision removing the stake of malicious parties, not greedy forks (removing PNK to put another token).
A greedy fork has already been tried by Aragon and it failed. Making a Kleros copy isn’t that easy.
Can you give an example of that? If you are talking about the 10k$ of juror fees (pre-gas, so actual payouts if you count gas spent by jurors and the value of their time is way lower), this is negligible compared to the value that Kleros brings, including the creation and maintenance of the whole system.
This has nothing to do with Kleros. Kleros is fine even without disputes from PoH. The challenger ecosystem on the other hand is not. Keep in mind that 80% of lost deposits goes to challengers, only 20% goes to Kleros jurors.
The dispute rate is very low at 4%. This means that PoH pays less than 1$ per registration to Kleros jurors.
Which FUD? I just corrected the info that Vitalik was the largest holder while the coop is the largest holder.
That isn’t true, using a separate token will prevent mutualization of the security. The UBI marketcap is extremely low (0.5M) and attacks on it would be way easier than attacks on PNK.
The PoH DAO doesn’t own UBI. UBI is a project created by democracy earth owned by the UBI DAO, not PoH. UBI is one application of PoH, but far from the only one.
From what I know, the Yubiai folks are incubated and funded by Kleros.
Could you show us exactly what was built? Because I only see a paper and a token contract (and even for the token contract, it looks like Kleros handled the security part and the pools). So this doesn’t seem much for 1.2M$.
