HIP: 49
title: Change Proof of Humanity Arbitrator to a Kleros fork that uses UBI token
authors: monik, v4len.eth, mathiaus.eth, Leti, HBesso31.eth, pcorace.eth, nicobilinkis.eth, Berty.eth, Sobol- castorpolux.eth, ocio, Roberto Iquitos, Andres Vilches, Ruben Alejandro Puca Vilte, drlorente97.eth, jfdominguez.eth, Pablo Buencrypto, ANM, Flor Velastiqui, Hernán DLF, lautaro.eth, Dez
status: Phase-1
created: 2022-06-29
HIP en español: Skiff
Simple Summary
The goal of this proposal is to change the smart contract that deals with disputes to the profile submission and removals (a.k.a, the Arbitrator) with a new one that serves better the interests of the Proof of Humanity community.
Abstract
The Proof of Humanity contract will change its arbitrator to a new deployment of a Kleros Arbitrator that will be an exact replica of the existing one but with two main changes:
Jurors will be able to stake the UBI token (0xDd1Ad9A21Ce722C151A836373baBe42c868cE9a4) as the pinakion token on the arbitrator. UBI has been distributed to the Proof of Humanity community since the beginning, thus this action will align the dispute resolution of humans effectively with the Proof of Humanity community allowing everyone to engage with the dispute resolution mechanism. This action will also significantly increase the utility around UBI, generating more incentives to accumulate the token.
The Governor of the new contract will be set to the Proof of Humanity Governor address (0x327a29fcE0a6490E4236240Be176dAA282EcCfdF) so future changes around Proof of Humanity’s dispute resolution court are set by its own community as well.
Everything else will remain exactly the same in order to guarantee compatibility with the road tested settings of past dispute resolutions.
Motivation
As of today, we have found that the DAO needs to grow the use cases of UBI to increase the potential for growth. By utilizing UBI for a new Humanity Court, we give the possibility to each —present and future— registered humans to actively engage in the curation of the registry. This makes Proof of Humanity more inclusive and empowering of its own users.
The current status quo around PNK Courts suggests there’s currently a high concentration of PNK in the existing Humanity Court that has incentivized spurious behaviours of challengers that have alternatively and haphazardly exploited loopholes of the early Submission Criteria.
Specification
(Required for Phase 2)
Rationale
The incorporation of a UBI-based Governor would reduce the risk of the DAO being captured in a Governance Gridlock by actors that are not aligned with the core interests of Proof of Humanity. This change will increase the robustness of the DAO, in accordance to a more mature decentralization since every verified human accrues UBI. Additionally, we would be able to modify the Governor with the power of 1 person 1 vote, avoiding the capture of the Humanity Court from whales and concentrated interests. DAO control over the arbitrator is key to emancipate Proof of Humanity as an autonomous organization free from centralized interests.
With autonomy over the design of the courts we can later add the possibility of limiting large concentrations of staking, and incentivizing the same principles of equal access to justice within our Registry. Another advantage that we have over the Kleros Courts is that Humanity Court can better specify and regulate juror misconduct or exploitative behaviours in a faster, more efficient way.
Future implementations of Courts serving the Proof of Humanity protocol —whether its Kleros v2 or a new compatible Arbitator— can only be accepted if they also follow the configurations described on this HIP and thus maintain UBI as the pinakion token of the court and the Proof of Humanity Governor as the court governor. No other settings can be accepted in the case of a Court Update in the future.
Taking into consideration that UBI and PNK are on a similar price range today of $0.01 and $0.02 respectively, there are no incompatibilities in the tokenomics other than the fact that UBI lowers even more the barrier of users to become jurors since it is streamed to every human.
Implementation
An exact replica of the existing Kleros arbitration contract will be deployed on Ethereum Mainnet.
The same version of KlerosLiquid.sol smart contract found on Proof of Humanity’s current court available on 0x988b3A538b618C7A603e1c11Ab82Cd16dbE28069 will be used.
The new court will be deployed with the following settings in its constructor function:
// The governor of the contract will be set to the Proof of Humanity governor.
address _governor = 0x327a29fcE0a6490E4236240Be176dAA282EcCfdF
// The pinakion token contract will be set to the UBI token.
Pinakion _pinakion = 0xDd1Ad9A21Ce722C151A836373baBe42c868cE9a4
// The random number generator contract will keep using the existing RNG.
RNG _RNGenerator = 0x1738B62E403090666687243e758b1C29eDfFc90e
// The minimum staking time.
uint _minStakingTime = 8700000000000000000000
// The maximum drawing time.
uint _maxDrawingTime = 7200
// Whether to use commit and reveal or not.
bool _hiddenVotes = false
// Minimum tokens needed to stake in the court.
uint _minStake = 8700000000000000000000
// Basis point of tokens that are lost when incoherent.
uint _alpha = 5000
// Arbitration fee paid per juror.
uint _feeForJuror = 25000000000000000
uint _jurorsForCourtJump = 31
// The time allotted to each dispute period in the form `timesPerPeriod[period]`.
uint[4] _timesPerPeriod = [540000, 437400, 437400, 291600]
// The number of children per node of the general court's sortition sum tree.
uint _sortitionSumTreeK = 8
Once this contract has been successfully deployed on mainnet, a ticket on the Proof of Humanity governor will be submitted executing changeArbitrator with the parameter address _arbitrator set with the new contract.
Me fue concedido el honor de publicar esta propuesta histórica en representación de las personas co-autoras. Mi más sincero agradecimiento por ello.
Que se de la discusión, debate y deliberación necesarias para lograr una comunidad verdaderamente autogestiva.
Making a KlerosLiquid fork is easy. The infrastructure that holds Kleros together is the hard part.
This HIP will have bad consequences and disastrous UX if it passes and there is no infrastructure holding it.
The infrastructure will mean server cost and dev maintenance. The PoH DAO has no developer to do this maintenance and implement this. Bots, emails, notifications, action bots…
I think that the kleros infra is really huge. It will be complex to match some of their features. Nevertheless, I think that it’s not necessary to fork or replicate everything.
Maybe we should start with the smart contracts and a minimal juror’s UI.
Hi
Can you elaborate a bit more about the whales problem?
I usually like the quadratic “things”, but here we also have PoH, so I cannot really imagine the scenario of whales taking over.
Thanks
The complexity of implementation shouldn’t stop us from expressing what we want stand for as a DAO… and most importantly: that should never be a backstop to decentralization. That said: I don’t think adapting new infra is that complex, we still have the code of existing UI and subgraphs that we can use in case Kleros is unwilling to cooperate.
Ideally we can adapt the new UI being built by @AvsA and @nicobilinkis.eth to include the Court functionality directly there. That would be really good in terms of UX actually.
We could do a similar implementation to the UBIVOTE that we have in place with the Snapshot of UBI. The code of Kleros Liquid is no easy-peasy and I wouldn’t recommend any modifications to it at this stage in order to not waste time auditing contracts that will likely be deprecated for v2… specially considering that Kleros v2 will come in the future with support for Proof of Humanity profiles.
Maybe —thinking out loud here— we can use the UBIVOTE token as the pinankion to KlerosLiquid.sol rather than simply UBI… and that way the balances are always the UBI square root of a holder + the holder will be a PoH valid address. This though, will make jurors public faces and not anonymous (but maybe that’s really a feature in a Humanity Court more than anything else, favoring more empathic rulings).
I’m with Kleros and I wish for Kleros and PoH to continue the journey together if the community decides so.
At the same time part of me is curious to see where this experiment will lead to, given with the new UBIVOTE mechanics or even the governance of the arbitration court itself. Many people at Kleros and in the community have spent countless hours thinking about the problems that Kleros is meant to solve since 2016 so if there is anything we can ultimately learn from each other and provide better arbitration for the space, that’s worth it.
The technical aspects of implementing this proposal seem to be in good hands so instead I’ll add some context on the rationale for changing the arbitrator.
Chainalysis has just published some research across the top 10 DAOs in web3 and it’s right on topic of the criticism made against Kleros. If you thought that PNK concentration is too high, perhaps that serves as a reality check.
<quote>
Research findings across the top 10 DAOs
(based the public report, the full report is behind a paywall)
Voting power: less than 1% of all holders have 90% of voting power.
Effectively, only between 1 in 1,000 and 1 in 10,000 of these ten DAOs’ holders have enough tokens to pass a proposal.
If too many holders can create a proposal, the average proposal’s quality may fall, and the DAO may be riddled with governance spam. But if too few can, the community may come to feel that “decentralized governance” rings false.
</quote>
That’s where we are as an ecosystem and it’s definitely not ideal but should we cancel Web3 because it’s not where we wish it to be today?
Decentralization is really hard, it does require more work to get things moving from A to B (especially at the beginning) and is very easy to get it wrong. So many have failed at this.
Decentralizing early when product/market fit is not entirely clear yet and there’s still so much to build, it is not necessarily the best use of resources, it has a cost on speed of execution, at least initially and for a while.
If there was already a proven playbook to decentralize from day 1 without weighting excessively on building and shipping, I like to believe that we as an ecosystem would have adopted it already. That’s why the progressive decentralization playbook over several years (not months) is still the safest path.
A good example is Gitcoin, the DAO and token launched after 3 years of building and the tech has been a web2 monolith for 4 years, they’ve only just announced the grants v2 architecture.
In the meantime it’s very easy to get distracted with governing governance.
First of all I’d like say that I’ve never been as sad seeing a proposal before and I can’t help to think that this is part of a general effort to divide the project (see this proposal asking to remove me from the board just 1 month after being elected).
With Proof Of Humanity being maintained by the Kleros Cooperative (which develops Kleros, but also projects of the ecosystem including Proof Of Humanity), this would have for effect of firing the entire Proof Of Humanity paid team (devs, smart contract auditors, cryptoeconomists, community managers) as the cooperative cannot allocate funding to projects outside of the Kleros ecosystem.
Answering proposed arguments
First I would answer all the points of this proposal.
As UBI is a project built on top of Proof Of Humanity, it looks like adding uses to UBI would help the project, wouldn’t it?
Well that’s not that simple as if Proof Of Humanity was built on top of Kleros, Kleros is also building on top of Proof Of Humanity with human courts on V2. So it looks likes the interest of one project of the ecosystem would clash with another one.
Here the fairest approach would be to keep the initial arbitrator, particularly since funding and development for the project came from it (Kleros, gives PNK grants to the Kleros Cooperative, which in turn sells those and develops Proof Of Humanity).
The author doesn’t give any specific example of “loophole” abuse. Moreover, the rules are decided by Proof Of Humanity, so if there is a loophole in the rules somewhere, that’s something the DAO can fix, not Kleros.
On the “concentration” in the Human Court, let’s look at some graph of stake repartitions in this court:
We could compare it with Ethereum mining repartition to see that the Human Court is well balanced even for crypto standards.
There has never been any threat from Kleros to “capture” PoH in governance gridlock. Everything which was voted by the DAO was always enforced by the Kleros Governor (contract allowing people to implement governance decisions from a technical perspective and solving disputes through Kleros in case of disagreement over the implementation), actually there hasn’t even been one dispute about that.
Moreover, separation of powers (the DAO being the legislative and Kleros the judiciary, see this ETHCC talk) is important for DAOs. In particular, separation of powers helps in making sure that decisions are taken based on the rules and not political considerations.
This would actually be the opposite. By making a fork of current version of Kleros, it would not be possible to customize courts for this. However, by staying within the Kleros ecosystem, Proof Of Humanity would benefit from the version 2 of Kleros with modular court allowing those mechanisms (only allowing humans, quadratic drawing weights). Moreover, those courts relying on Proof of Humanity could be used by other projects, not just PoH. This would lead to more PoH use.
Is the proposal really about the arbitrator?
This proposal appears to have been done after some drama in the Spanish Proof Of Humanity telegram.
For those who haven’t followed, an admin (Luis who lost the election for the board) had removed the administration rights of two board members (Shin and myself).
Note that there wasn’t anything “illegal” into adding board members as admin, the DAO had never voted on group admins and the closest expression of the DAO related to that topic was HIP-7 stating that the board should manage “Any resource requiring high trust by the community”.
After that the cooperative restored the administration rights to a neutral state (only board members) allowing the board to nominate more moderators. After that the board set up rules about moderator designation and moderation.
This led to an admin (here it’s hard to tell whom as the password was shared between multiple people) using the Proof Of Humanity Twitter for accusations (which were removed and the password reset).
This infuriated the admins who had been removed (even if those could have asked the board to vote them back as admin) who created another telegram channel.
There, they made their plan to remove me from the board leading to HIP-48 and to remove Kleros leading to this HIP.
I obviously support people making proposals if they think those improves Proof Of Humanity. But here it looks more that this was done by some people having a personal crusade in order to “punish” Federico and myself and not with the best interest of the protocol.
I also got weird DMs, one guy comparing me and my actions to Putin mass murders in Ukraine, some homophobic and racist comments.
As a project founder we need to have tough skin, but I would be lying if I pretended not to be affected by this public lynching in a language that I cannot speak, but can understand.
I wonder about the real goal of this proposal and believe other people are wondering too.
If it’s not broken, don’t fix it
Currently Kleros has been providing good services to Proof Of Humanity at a very cheap price (on average 1$ per registration). Out of the 614 cases, I defy anyone to show any “obviously wrong” ruling given by it.
I understand the argument of giving more value to UBI, but as the fees to jurors are quite low (lifetime of 10k$), this wouldn’t have much effect value to the staking token is determined in relation to: Juror_Revenue - Value_Of_Juror_Time_Spent - Gas_Fees_Paid_By_Juror.
You can find a more detailed model on this research note of William.
Current Synergistic Relationship
Proof of Humanity was invented (based on an idea of Vitalik Buterin, see this initial paper), developed (starting in August 2019 during the bear market) and is still developed by the Kleros Cooperative. There is currently:
1 dev completely focused on it (Andrei)
1 dev working on the infra around it. He is working for the infra in general but Proof of Humanity is probably the most demanding part (was the target of some IPFS DOS which even led to some data loss that was fixed and lost deposits were reimbursed by the cooperative)
6 devs helping sporadically with smart contract reviews, specific tasks and tech support.
1 integration manager working partly on it (trying to get other projects to use PoH)
2 Moderators/Community managers working partially on it, maintaining the English PoH channel, organizing community calls.
2 founders working partially on it, reaching out and helping other projects to use PoH (helping @Artistical_Intelligence, incubating and advising Yubiai)
There are even more people working on Kleros in general (20). Working on Kleros is half of the operation of the cooperative. Working on ecosystem development (which includes PoH) is the other half.
All of those are PoH members and registered. Some also actively promoting PoH among friends in their personal time.
The fees paid are quite low: 25$ per juror (and jurors need to pay for gas so the real pay is even lower) with disputes starting with 1 juror, the total paid (by the way this website is supporting UBI by using 90% of its revenues to burn UBI) being slightly below 10k$ and are far from offsetting the contributor compensation (even if we don’t count juror work). However, Proof Of Humanity serves as a flagship integration (perhaps the most famous) allowing to prove that Kleros work.
Moreover, the currently developed Kleros V2 will allow (see the yellow paper p10-11) courts filled with Proof Of Humanity jurors (to prevent jurors being drawn multiple times). So Kleros will rely more and more in Proof Of Humanity in the future.
For this reasons, the cooperative has incentive into the success of Proof of Humanity.
Similarly, Proof of Humanity benefits from Kleros:
It was created by it (by the coop receiving PNK grants from Kleros).
It gets continuous support and development.
It gets a high level of security (ultimately backed against 51% attacks by a 15M$ market cap).
While paying a very cheap price for it (10k$ paid in total). Note that on lost deposits in case of rejected registration, only 0.025ETH goes to the juror, the remaining 0.1 going to the challenger. With an approximate 4% challenge rate, this means that Proof Of Humanity pays an average of 1$ per submission to the Kleros protocol (way lower than gas costs).
There is a synergistic relationship that would be broken by this proposal.
Resource Management Perspective
Currently the Proof Of Humanity is extremely understaffed compared to the potential of the project. This proposal having the effect of firing all the paid team (as those are paid by the Cooperative, in turn paid by Kleros, which obviously cannot pay for competing projects outside of its ecosystem) would turn chronic under-staffing making progress slow into critical under-staffing where even maintenance of the infrastructure would not be guaranteed.
As most of the Kleros team loves Proof Of Humanity, some may still help in their free time. But after such a proposal this is nothing but guaranteed.
Adding the creation and maintenance of a Kleros fork would also add to that burden. This may even represent some existential risks to Proof Of Humanity.
Risks of Running a fork
The main risks are:
Lack of maintenance leading to some services being unavailable. The cooperative is running a bunch of services making Kleros use easy, a frontend, bots to execute function calls which can be executed by everyone, notification services, etc. The smart contract can always run without those, but that would make the UX way worse and hard to use by non technical users.
Attacks on the court. The current court has been running without attacks since 2019. But a new court may not work that way, in particular if there isn’t much payouts to jurors and apparently the proposer would like for there to be even less disputes after changing the court.
Without a flow disputes or the expectation of a future flow, UBI wouldn’t be much valuable (currently only offering economic security of 0.5M$, 15 times lower than PNK). This would significantly decrease budget security (how much do you need to have for an attack to be successful).
Moreover, since UBI is already valuable independently of being used in a Kleros fork, this would mean that in case of attack its value wouldn’t drop to 0. So the cost security (how much it would cost the attacker to attack the system) would be even lower.
Using Kleros as a large arbitrator with a lot of integrations means that security is mutualized between the dapps using it, making each of them more secure.
Vision for Proof of Humanity
Here this proposal is about the vision of Proof of Humanity.
Should it be a protocol searching collaboration? Or more of a protocol self centered in some manner akin to nationalism (we only want “pure” PoH works where pure being what is built on top of PoH and not what PoH relies on, talking about “sovereignty”).
One of the main reasons that I am a believer in web3 is the composability (sometimes called money lego). People build protocols on top of and connected to each others, leading to systems of systems that individual projects could not accomplish by themselves.
For example when we created Proof Of Humanity, we were thinking that one of the first usecases would be to distribute a Universal Basic Income. We had plans for that but preferred to have this handled by another team and that’s why we reached out to Democracy Earth which had announced a UBI token (at this time called HOUR) to see if they would be interested using Proof Of Humanity. We accepted and also helped them with the smart contract of the token, pools for bootstrapping liquidity and integrated claiming tokens directly in the UI. All of this without getting any of the initial supply of UBI which belongs to Democracy Earth and the DAO, as we believed collaborating with other projects was more important.
This was also true for what would go on bottom: better to use Ethereum instead of creating a new chain. In the same way that using Ethereum allows for network effects, using Kleros allows for network effects (new version of Kleros developed to use Proof Of Humanity, Kleros community “shilling” PoH for people to integrate, Kleros community apps burning UBI).
I think the Proof of Humanity community would benefit from being seen as cooperative. And here, removing the arbitrator which funded and made the project for reasons more related to “politics” than security would probably be seen as uncooperative/ungrateful and send a wrong signal to organizations which may consider funding or working with Proof Of Humanity.
The move forward
There are a few way that we could go forward without negatively impacting Proof Of Humanity.
We should acknowledge that some part of community (a subset of the community of the Spanish speaking telegram) has bad feelings against Kleros and the creators of Proof of Humanity.
Starting from there, a few roads are possible:
See that the divisions are irreconcilable and have the wider community take the side of this HIP leading to all the impacts before-mentioned.
See that the divisions are irreconcilable while the wider community rejects this HIP. In this case, the part of the community supporting it could deploy a fork of the project (without needing to restart the list of human from scratch as it could recognize humans registered before the fork).
Manage to solve internal divisions which I believe are mainly the fruit of miscommunication, the language barrier not helping.
For me my order of preference is clearly 3 > 2 > 1. But ultimately it’s up to the community to decide.
The implications of this proposal cannot be taken lightly. To put things into perspective, here’s a simple analogy;
Let’s say a construction company was tasked with building an apartment complex. The agreement is that once the complex is finished, all residents would get part ownership of it so that no centralised entity could evict anyone without first going through a democratic vote. Now let’s say that in the middle of construction, the soon-to-be residents staged a coup to remove the construction company completely.
Now substitue the appartment complex with PoH and you’ll see that cutting ties with the cooperative would effectively bring the project to a complete halt.
Every project has growing pains, and whether we like it or not, first iterations are never perfect. I realise that our communities haven’t necessarily gotten along, but I urge everyone to take a step back and make a decision that will benefit Proof of Humanity in the long run.
Como hispanohablante, y como parte activa de la comunidad hispanohablante de POH (y no habiendo una HIP que lo prohiba hasta donde tengo entendido), decidí que en primer lugar escribiré mi comentario en español que es mi idioma nativo.
Sin dudas esta HIP representa un paso muy importante para la comunidad de POH, pero una comunidad que no tiene autonomía de decisión, ¿es una comunidad libre? El cambio que proponemos no es sencillo, pero esa complejidad y tecnicismo no deberían ser un impedimento para asumir la responsabilidad como DAO de tomar nuestras propias decisiones y afrontar las consecuencias de las mismas, sin perder el foco en el objetivo con el que este proyecto fue verdaderamente creado, al menos para mi: el derecho HUMANO a la identidad digital DESCENTRALIZADA.
-Automatic translation:
As Spanish speaker, and as an active part of the Spanish speaking POH community (and not having a HIP that forbids it as far as I understand), first of all I will write my comment in Spanish which is my native language.
Undoubtedly this HIP represents a very important step for the POH community, but is a community that does not have autonomy of decision a free community? The change we propose is not simple, but that complexity and technicality should not be an impediment to assume the responsibility as DAO to make our own decisions and face the consequences of them, without losing focus on the objective with which this project was truly created, at least for me: the HUMAN right to a DECENTRALIZED digital identity.
This seems like a dangerous proposal imo. I don’t see the benefits being worth the costs and issues and loss of Kleros team. It’s like a blockchain Brexit. Building some ideal of sovereignty and control but slicing apart the co-operative resilience that is actually very practical for holding it together.
Is there really a budget and team to build and maintain and secure all of this? Would it not be more practical for those developers to work on new integrations and involvement and adoption of ubi and poh with other protocols, rather than rebuilding something we already have working?
i don’t see anywhere in the proposal that claims that kleros is being kicked out or anything remotely close to that. if anything, this is a change that takes the use of kleros to a whole new level and in accordance to what the kleros protocol permits and what i has been stated in its white paper. this kind of FUD doesn’t paint a good picture on how the kleros community works together.
also, i don’t think it’s appropriate to mix topics and talk about other moderators or personal grudges regarding the conversation about this HIP. none of that has anything to do with this and it should be respected that we keep the thread on topic about the HIP.
what is being proposed here is very straightforward and imho beneficial to all:
a proof of humanity free from any big brother risk.
a kleros arbitration capable of accepting changes that goes against their interest.
aligning the arbitration of humans to the criteria of humans and lowering the barriers to access the right to judge profiles (little brothers > big brother).
effectively controlling the arbitrator governor by the proof of humanity community rather than the kleros coop.
the level of decentralization is evident among both organizations:
someone claimed here that “it’s better to start centralized and then effectively decentralize over time”. yes! that’s exactly what’s happening here… progressive decentralization is not something that simply happens, it’s something that the community must take action to really make it that way. and that’s what’s going on right now.
last but not least, list of developers working on UBI & proof of humanity who are not on the kleros payroll from the top of my mind:
santisiri
juanumusic
alan donoso
avsa
nico bilinkis,
ruben
aztor
justin kalland
the yubiai folks
they all legitimately contribute to the ui, to poh and ubi and are perfectly capable of doing what it takes. democracy earth foundation is happy to contribute the infrastructure necessary (eth nodes, ipfs, subgraph, hosting, etc).
if human rights depend on the wills of a single company, then this whole experiment is facebook 2.0.
nobody here wants that. and it’s time we figure out if we can become that.
Great discussion overall! It is healthy to think out loud about these topics.
I could not agree more with this:
I find questionable to try to give an explanation so simplistic to this topic as “this is a break, Kleros would not be able to fund anything, etc”
That is not entirely true and sounds like a lot of FUD to me.
Less conservatism, let’s think without barriers. If this experiment fails, a point would be proven anyway.
Remaining the same would not prove anything at all. "Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try again. Fail again. Fail better."
Hace 15 meses empece a seguir el proyecto, Proof Of Humanity y también su arbitrador Kleros. Siempre se promocionó como Justicia descentralizada, y como muestra la evidencia antes presentada en este hilo, ni la participación en la corte, ni mucho menos la manera de votar implementaciones en el Protocolo de Kleros están en efecto descentralizadas.
He tratado de buscar Incentivos para adquirir PNK y participar en la Corte humanitaria. Nunca los encontré.
Así mismo, he visto muchas veces como se desalentaban los intentos de proponer una alternativa más alineado a los objetivos de nuestra DAO. Es entendible cuando participan actores con intereses que no son propios de PoH.
Si Kleros no ofrece el producto que la comunidad reclama lo buscaremos en otro lado o lo crearemos nosotros.
The Kleros distribution graph says nothing. It’s just a graph of the wallets that have voted in snapshot, but like Kleros is not one wallet one vote, you cant know if in the small squares a user controls multiple wallets (like in farming / puppeting in poh). Even more, as I said you in twitter, Ive more than two accounts with PNKs and I’ve no voted with all of them in the snapshot, so the input data it’s biased. In addition to that, the snapshot votes in Kleros DAO are more about Court parameters (most of them, if not all, were accepted), not related to other topics for now.
Regarding this proposal, there are no explanations of several technical issues that can arise in the implementation, so for the phase 2, if this proposal it’s approved in this phase, I would like to see a whole implementation of the arbitrator in a testnet. And for phase 3 would be nice to have the arbitrator with all the associated infrastructure deployed on mainnet (with jurors staked) so we can battle test it before doing the change in arbitrator, for the sake of security of this project. There are other technical issues that came to my mind, but I will expect more clarification about how will be this implemented to say it, because depends on that implementation if it’s a problem or not.
From my perspective, this HIP it’s in the wrong direction because this change doesn’t attack the “concentration” or whale problem that it’s intended to attack, if it’s just switching token to UBI as is sayd in the proposal. Maybe if the UBIVote token it’s used (I don’t know how will solve the SEVERAL technicalities that will arise if that change it’s made in a kleros fork court) you will have a 1human-1vote in the court, but you will be doxxing the jurors which in my opinion leads to a worst scenario. I would like to remember to this community that in the early days of PoH several challengers that uses their PoH wallet were attacked in the telegram groups because they made a challenge (even when the challenge was right, the profile doesn’t met the listing criteria). So, to me, doxxing the jurors it’s not the best approach. Remember that in a dispute, always will be a side that will lose, then that part will be hurt and can take revenge publicly only because the juror vote against him, even if the vote is coherent with the policy requirement. And with revenge I mean doxxing more data of the juror that is not in PoH.
There is another major issue, that the biggest problem of PoH IT’S THE POLICY. And no matter which arbitrator you use, if your policy has grey zones, there are some vector attacks that you can not solve. So, as I’ve said so many times in the last year. LET SOLVE THE POLICY, but I know that it’s easy to attack the arbitrator instead of seeing our own problems.
I think we should remember that at the base of this DAO is a system that works because of sybil resistance. The projects built on top of PoH, which serve as incentive to sign up (UBI, governance etc.) have value because the sybil-proof mechanism works.
I am not aware of any Kleros fork that was successful. That doesn’t mean that forking doesn’t work as much as it means that an arbitration system is a very hard thing to do right, or better than Kleros is currently doing it. Changing the arbitrator to an experimental one is nothing less than an existential risk. Is the DAO aware of all the factors involved to take such a risk?
Many of the recent debates in the PoH have been about greyspots around the policy and how Kleros dealt with those. We can accept both the policy and Kleros as non-perfect.
The incentive for Kleros is to retain the reputation as the best arbitrator. Rulings around greyspots don’t show fragility in the system that much and don’t hurt the reputation. Thus a rational solution here is to constructively help improve the policy so to make it more clear and not leave room for rulings from Kleros that go “against the DAO” (since the policy should reflect what the DAO requires for people to be on PoH). I believe this kind of separation of powers is best to make the DAO coherent and cohesive for both insiders and outsiders.
We can also accept Kleros as a non-perfect system and try to fix it. As mentioned, Kleros is working on a new version allowing drawing of jurors based on for example PoH registration status. Why not let Kleros experiment with such a new mechanism and, if successful, have PoH adopt it?
Even discussion around the centralization of Kleros can be more constructive and understanding. I can vouch that members of Kleros support decentralization and are currently working on (and interested in) solutions to bring working decentralization outside but also inside the organization (also for PoH). I believe recent discussions have shown the need for such solutions and will foster the way for Kleros and others to develop them.
I believe these points cover most of the expressed cause for the momentum built around such a proposal.
