[Phase 1] HIP #49 Change of Arbitrator

[clesaege]

@ludovico

• The practice of precedent chaining of edge cases is just one example,
• the 360p quality and not 360 pixels minimum interpretation is another.
• The invention of a thing called “effective size” in rotated and padded videos is another (it was not defined in acceptance criteria and yet they were challenged and removed).
• Calling “filter” something that is not (black and white pictures are not a threat to sybil resistance and it is also definitely not a filter, but yet they were challenged and removed).
• Using a small cropping on top or the bottom of the face and calling that “no facial features were visible” when actually any facial detection filters available where able to identify the face corresponding to the user.

Could you give links to those? Maybe you disagree on some edge cases, but the rules were always applied. If you believe the way to handle some edgecase is bad, you can make a proposal to modify the rules to specify the edge case and this would not be an edgecase anymore.

@ludovico

There is not to much to say that there are currently only 36 wallets occupying more than 3/4s of the humanity court, while 164 take the rest of the seats.

This pie chart is highly confusing and you know it. I showed this chart and asked people how many people were required to get the majority and they all said 3 (which is wrong). This pie chart is grouping all wallets with similar staking size together while the chart I gave is objective row data.

@ludovico

Moreover, it is the view of Kleros’ CTO says publicly that this level of concentration is a good thing to have, because supposedly he considers a high concentration at courts (like him occupying more than 50% of the stake of Technical court) a way of the “good jurors” set the “good criteria” (whatever good or bad is in this case, and in the context of game theory).

That isn’t true, I said that initially to bootstrap courts good functioning it was good for large stakeholders to stake, but that overtime courts should decentralize and the Humanity court was a good example of that.

@ludovico

Also, Clement himself recognizes that “bank attacks” could happen in a Kleros court, in which regular registered Humans would be helpless to defend themselves, because even with the possibility of crowdfound an appeal, no one has enough time or resources to gather that amount of funds, especially when the perception of concentration and bias in the court is incredibly high.

Again, taking my messages out of context. This is an answer to the idea of allowing an unlimited amount of appeals. So yeah, in a hypothetical version of Kleros with an unlimited number of appeals, you could have bank attacks, that’s why there is a limited number of appeal of in Kleros, thus Kleros is protected from bank attacks.

@ludovico

The “whataboutist” comparison with ethereum mining is first, not relevant since we are not talking about mining or not even governance, and second very tangent to what we are talking about which is access to the right of participation in the justice process of our own DAO.

It is not “whataboutism”, I’m a huge supporter of Ethereum. The comparison is only to show what people consider decentralized.

@ludovico

Let me add also what the criteria of what the high standards of one of the Kleros DAO leader has over what he considers what a “good court” is:

I don’t see anything wrong with that, do you mean you want stupid people to rule on cases?
Here I’m pointing the importance of initial conditions for Schelling games. Since jurors are incentivized to rule according to the final ruling, if they know that the court is mainly composed of clever people, they should do it in a clever way, but if it were composed of stupid people, even clever jurors would have to rule in a stupid way to be coherent with them.

[fnanni]

@ludovico

• The practice of precedent chaining of edge cases is just one example,
• the 360p quality and not 360 pixels minimum interpretation is another.
• The invention of a thing called “effective size” in rotated and padded videos is another (it was not defined in acceptance criteria and yet they were challenged and removed).
• Calling “filter” something that is not (black and white pictures are not a threat to sybil resistance and it is also definitely not a filter, but yet they were challenged and removed).
• Using a small cropping on top or the bottom of the face and calling that “no facial features were visible” when actually any facial detection filters available where able to identify the face corresponding to the user.

These are just your subjective opinions. In PoH you will find 16k slightly different opinions on how to rule disputes with any given policy. For example, in my case, I disagree with 4 out of the 5 points you mentioned, but I still recognize that there are reasonable arguments on the other side of the discussion. As it has been said and done many times, the good thing is that PoH can adjust the rules if there is democratic consensus that a case should have been ruled differently. So far, some of those adjustments were aligned with your believes (360p quality), some others not (black & white pics).

With your rationale (thinking that there is only one right way of interpreting subjectivities in the policy), there is no arbitrator that will ever fit your wishes. Not even the Kleros-UBI fork. I recommend you waiting for Kleros v2 and setting up a “Ludoviko Module Subcourt” where you can be the single, qualified juror and rule according to your believes.

Talking about stake distributions… It may be counter-intuitive, but even a Ludoviko Subcourt would be decentralized if it can be immediately appealed to a Humanity Subcourt. Decentralization is not a picture.

Let me ask you some questions:

1. If we continued using Kleros, what would you consider a secure stake distribution? For example, would 30 wallets having the current 50% of the court stake be enough? 50 wallets? 100? 1000? How many and what is your criteria?
2. In a Kleros fork that uses UBI, how will people know if a stake distribution is secure enough according to your standards? 30 wallets having the 50% of the court stake? 100? 1000?
3. If a court with stakes that you consider distributed enough rules against your believes, what will your reaction be?
4. Let’s say that UBI Courts are implemented and governed by PoH. Can you give me a few simple examples of HIPs that could modify court parameters in a way that prevents/punishes juror behaviors that you consider unacceptable?

Don’t get me wrong, I don’t think Kleros courts are perfect (no court will be perfect). Here are some of the improvements that I’d like to see (and none of them is about the distribution of stakes of a given court at a given time):

• Better alignment of incentives between appeal funders and jurors. Today there are some edge cases in which a juror can be “coherent” even if the final ruling (according to PoH) is opposite. This will not happen in Kleros v2.
• Lower fees. Cheaper arbitration means that first rounds can include more jurors without getting prohibetly expensive and/or it gets also cheaper to take the risk of appealing. This will improve both if Gnosis courts are used or if Kleros v2 on a rollup is used.
• Easier forking mechanisms integrated into the court itself. Again, this will improve in Kleros v2.
• Bigger market cap and bigger total stakes. Currently there are 350k USD staked in the Humanity subcourt and 4M USD in total. This is nice but it would be better if it increases. Demand for Kleros services is increasing and with competitors such as Aragon failing it seems pretty obvious to me that PNK stakes and market cap will increase in the future. (How does that look for UBI courts??)
• More diversity of subcourts with activity. I think we will see a lot of increase there, in particular with Curate, Realitio and Insurance claims.
• Maybe secret vote, but I’m not convinced that it will improve the quality of the courts. In any case, PoH could ask Kleros to create a Humanity subcourt with commit & reveal scheme.
• Better ways of determining when an appeal should jump to a parent court. I believe there is some work in this regard in Kleros v2, but I don’t know for sure.

In my opinion, UBI courts will be just another low quality fork of Kleros.

[jfdominguez.eth]

Esto no es una lucha personal, no es @clesaege vs @ludovico no tiene nada que ver con la HIP de Luis ni con la moderación de Clement. Ese argumento no solo es una falacia, sino que además es una sub-estimación hacia los firmantes de la HIP y de muchos colaboradores de la DAO.

Poh DAO está en un momento de crecimiento, donde quiere y necesita poder tomar decisiones que estén cada vez mas alineadas con sus objetivos y no tener una coop como Kleros con la última palabra sobre su autonomía.

Los intereses de Kleros DAO y de Poh DAO no son 100% los mismos, pueden tener puntos de alineamiento, pero mientras Kleros busca darle valor al PNK y en caso que esto este alineado con ese objetivo, valorizar el UBI. Poh DAO busca darle valor y uso al UBI incluso cuando esto pueda ir en contra del valor del PNK.

El objetivo de esta HIP#49 es que las decisiones últimas de Poh DAO no estén necesariamente superditadas a los objetivos de Kleros, para eso se propone el cambio de Arbitrator y por consiguiente de Governor.

• Porque la autonomía basada en humanos no puede ni debe estar superditada en ultima instancia a la autonomia Plutocrática de algunas wallets, y si eso ocurriera que se tenga la autonomía de corregirlo pronto.

• Porque en estos 16 meses de vida se demostró que la justicia utilizada para activos o casos financieros no siempre funciona cuando lo que se está arbitrando son humanos.

• Porque no se puede pensar que el desarrollo de Poh es de Kleros, que si bien pagó muchos de los recursos, el trabajo incansable y ad-honorem de la comunidad fue la fuerza vital que lo trajo hasta donde está. [^3]

• Porque el whitepaper de Kleros [^1] lo contempla como alternativa, e incluso se describe como un atributo.

Kleros tiene mucho para ganar con esta decision, si este experimiento es exitoso está probando que el punto 4.9 de su white paper es aplicable, esto no solo no disminuye su valor en el mediano plazo, ciertamente lo aumenta. Tener un camino de salida claro y probado puede acelerar la toma de decisiones de quienes estén pensado en usarlo y Kleros va a encontrar más casos de uso que antes.

Argumentos

• Que UBI sea el token para hacer stake en las cortes no solo democratiza la justicia, además lo hace más justo. Hoy en día la posibilidad de ser elegido para una corte, está asociada 100% al stake de PNK que se puede traducir en dinero, este sistema deja afuera a una gran parte de los humanos y plantea un juego injusto donde el valor del dinero no es igual para todos, fomenta la creación de una Plutocracia, que por tener más dinero en juego, tiene más poder y es muy dificil de alterarlo en el tiempo. UBI hoy es el token más democratico que existe en el ecosistema, la unica necesidad es un registro como humano, y con esta propuesta esto ya le permitiría a cuaqluiera ser parte de una corte.
• El stake de UBI tiene un sistema que complejiza la formación de WHALES, al ser un token inflacionario tambien con el tiempo se diluyen a las ballenas. Hoy en mayor UBI holder es VB con 1.8M. Con los aprox 15k registrados actualmente se emiten 10.8M UBI/mes. El mayor holder representa el 17% de la emisión de 1 mes.
• Los intereses de Poh DAO y Kleros DAO no están 100% alineados.
• Kleros viene aplicando iurispositivismo en sus cortes, y en muchos casos se vieron actitudes interpretativas para beneficiar la cantidad de casos en disputa, poniendo a la misma altura errores involuntarios, errores de UI con ataques al sistema. (352p, barras negras) o incluso demorando su corrección. Esto no solo desalienta la participación de nuevos jurados sino que además deja una gran parte de la población fuera del registro.
• Kleros esta OK con la autonomia de PoH DAO siempre y cuando esté alineada con sus objetivos, en el blog de gobierno de la DAO Clement comentó “The largest UBI wallet belongs to the cooperative with 2.1M UBI (we removed those from the pool for transparency).” [^4] muestra que ante las minima voluntad de independencia Kleros va a mostrar su verticalidad y va a generar FUD (Miedo, incertidumbre y Dudas) tanto en la comunidad Kleros como en la comunidad Poh.
• La propuesta HIP-49 en escencia está proponiendo un sistema más democrático para la toma de decisiones del protocolo Poh y que la misma no quede superditada en última instancia a una DAO que tiene una alta concentración (15 Wallets >51% de los votos, adicionalmente una persona puede tener más de 1 wallet). [^2]
• Poh Dao está en el top 10 de DAOS con mayor participación en Snapshot, pero su Arbitrator (ultima instancia de decisión) está montado sobre una DAO que dista de estar descentralizada.

El camino de la independencia no es un camino facil, pero estoy convencido que es un paso necesario.

Jfdominguez.eth

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Automatic translation

This is not a personal fight, it is not Clement vs Luis, it has nothing to do with Luis’ HIP nor Clement’s moderation. That argument is not only a fallacy, it is also an underestimation towards the HIP signatories and many DAO contributors.

Poh DAO is in a moment of growth, where wants and needs to be able to take decisions that are increasingly aligned with its goals and not have a coop like Kleros with the final say on its autonomy.

The interests of Kleros DAO and Poh DAO are not 100% the same, they may have points of alignment, but while Kleros seeks to give value to the PNK and in case this is aligned with that objective, to value the UBI. Poh DAO seeks to give value and use to the UBI even when this may go against the value of the PNK.

The objective of this HIP#49 is that the ultimate decisions of Poh DAO are not necessarily superceded to the objectives of Kleros, for that the change of Arbitrator and consequently of Governor is proposed.

• Because the human-based autonomy cannot and should not be ultimately superceded to the Plutocratic autonomy of some wallets, and if that were to happen, to have the autonomy to correct it soon.

• Because in these 16 months of life it was demonstrated that the justice used for assets or financial cases does not always work when what is being arbitrated are humans.

• Because it cannot be thought that the development of Poh is Kleros’, that although he paid for many of the resources, the tireless and ad-honorem work of the community was the vital force that brought it to where it is. [^3]

• Because the Kleros whitepaper [^1] contemplates it as an alternative, and it is even described as an attribute.

Kleros has a lot to gain with this decision, if this experiment is successful it is proving that point 4.9 of its white paper is applicable, this not only does not diminish its value in the medium term, it certainly increases it. Having a clear and proven exit path can accelerate decision making for those who are thinking of using it, and Kleros is going to find more use cases than before.

Arguments

• UBI as the token to stake in the courts not only democratizes justice, it also makes it fairer. Today the possibility of being elected to as juror is 100% associated to PNK stake, this can be translated into money; this system leaves out a large part of humans and poses an unfair game where the value of money is not equal for all, encourages the creation of a Plutocracy, which by having more money at stake, has more power and it is very difficult to modufy this situation over time. **UBI today is the most democratic token that exists in the ecosystem, the only request to have ir is to be registred as a human, and with this proposal this would allow anyone to be part of a court as juror.
• The UBI stake has a system that complicates the formation of WHALES, being an inflationary token, over time the whales are diluted. Today the biggest UBI holder is VB with 1.8M. With about 15k humans registered , 10.8M UBI/month tokensare being issed. The largest holder represents 17% of 1 month issuance.
• Poh DAO and Kleros DAO interests are not 100% aligned.
• Kleros has been applying iurispositivism in its courts, and in many cases interpretive attitudes were seen to benefit the number of cases in dispute. Putting unintentional errors, UI errors with attacks to the system at the same level. (352p, black bars) or even delaying their correction. This not only discourages the participation of new jurors but also leaves a large part of the population out of the registry.
• Kleros is OK with the autonomy of PoH DAO as long as it is aligned with its objectives, in the gov blog Clement commnt "The largest UBI wallet belongs to the cooperative with 2.1M UBI (we removed those from the pool for transparency). " [^4] shows that at the slightest will of independence Kleros will show its verticality and will generate FUD (Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt) both in the Kleros community and in the Poh community.
• The HIP-49 proposal in essence is proposing a more democratic system for decision making of the Poh protocol and that it is not ultimately subordinated to a DAO that has a high concentration (15 Wallets >51% of the votes, additionally a person can have more than 1 wallet). [^2]
• Poh Dao is in the top 10 DAOS with the highest Snapshot participation, but its Arbitrator (ultimate decision maker) is mounted on a DAO that is far from decentralized.

The road to independence is not an easy one, but I am convinced that it is a necessary step.

Jfdominguez.eth

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)

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[^1]: Kleros White Paper https://kleros.io/whitepaper_long_en.pdf We envisage writing arbitrable contracts in such a way that, with unanimous consent of the concerned parties, an arbitrator for an existing contract can be replaced with a fork of Kleros
[^2]: En el siguiente gráfico provisto por Clement se puede ver la distribución de PNK en wallets. multiples Wallets pueden pertenecer a una misma persona. 15 wallets concentran más del 51% del poder de voto en Kleros DAO

En estos gráficos se puedn ver la distribución de los votos de las 2 DAOs en Snapshot

[^3]: crowdfunders, crowdvouchers, chequeo de perfiles, más de 30 Comunity calls, canales de discusión en Telegram, canales de discusión en Discord, encuentros presenciales, UBI-Burner, Nueva UI, miles de horas de soporte y tantos otros.
[^4]: [Phase 1] HIP #49 Change of Arbitrator - #29 by santisiri

[jfdominguez.eth]

@fnanni

As it has been said and done many times, the good thing is that PoH can adjust the rules if there is democratic consensus that a case should have been ruled differently. So far, some of those adjustments were aligned with your believes (360p quality), some others not (black & white pics).

With your rationale (thinking that there is only one right way of interpreting subjectivities in the policy), there is no arbitrator that will ever fit your wishes. Not even the Kleros-UBI fork. I recommend you waiting for Kleros v2 and setting up a “Ludoviko Module Subcourt” where you can be the single, qualified juror and rule according to your believes.

What we are talking about is to have the Arbitrator and Governor full aligned to Poh DAO, we are not talking about one case or one court neither about @ludovico wills.

“Whoever controls the courts, controls the state”. Aristotle. This is how Kleros white paper introduction starts. Personally I want a court controlled by diverse humans with alligned interesses and not by 10-15 wallets with some other motivations.

I wish a inclusive register where attaks and mistakes are not trated as the same, and the answer “you allways can change the rules” is what started this HIP.

@fnanni

In my opinion, UBI courts will be just another low quality fork of Kleros.

At this moment my intention is not to improve Kleros is to have independence across all instances for Poh DAO. To Improve democracy by having more humans as jurors without any other interesses than UBI. To have an Arbitrator ruled by UBI, an inflationary token currently supplying 11M/month with the fairest distribution system so far.

[clesaege]

@jfdominguez.eth

The interests of Kleros DAO and Poh DAO are not 100% the same, they may have points of alignment, but while Kleros seeks to give value to the PNK and in case this is aligned with that objective, to value the UBI. Poh DAO seeks to give value and use to the UBI even when this may go against the value of the PNK.

PoH paid a total of 10 000$ to jurors, that is less than 1$ per registration. Putting UBI as a staking token will not significantly increase UBI price.

@jfdominguez.eth

Because the Kleros whitepaper [^1] contemplates it as an alternative, and it is even described as an attribute.

The fork explained in the whitepaper is forking in case of malicious decision removing the stake of malicious parties, not greedy forks (removing PNK to put another token).
A greedy fork has already been tried by Aragon and it failed. Making a Kleros copy isn’t that easy.

@jfdominguez.eth

Poh DAO and Kleros DAO interests are not 100% aligned.

Can you give an example of that? If you are talking about the 10k$ of juror fees (pre-gas, so actual payouts if you count gas spent by jurors and the value of their time is way lower), this is negligible compared to the value that Kleros brings, including the creation and maintenance of the whole system.

@jfdominguez.eth

Kleros has been applying iurispositivism in its courts, and in many cases interpretive attitudes were seen to benefit the number of cases in dispute. Putting unintentional errors, UI errors with attacks to the system at the same level. (352p, black bars) or even delaying their correction. This not only discourages the participation of new jurors but also leaves a large part of the population out of the registry.

This has nothing to do with Kleros. Kleros is fine even without disputes from PoH. The challenger ecosystem on the other hand is not. Keep in mind that 80% of lost deposits goes to challengers, only 20% goes to Kleros jurors.
The dispute rate is very low at 4%. This means that PoH pays less than 1$ per registration to Kleros jurors.

@jfdominguez.eth

Kleros is OK with the autonomy of PoH DAO as long as it is aligned with its objectives, in the gov blog Clement commnt "The largest UBI wallet belongs to the cooperative with 2.1M UBI (we removed those from the pool for transparency). " [^4] shows that at the slightest will of independence Kleros will show its verticality and will generate FUD (Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt) both in the Kleros community and in the Poh community.

Which FUD? I just corrected the info that Vitalik was the largest holder while the coop is the largest holder.

@jfdominguez.eth

The HIP-49 proposal in essence is proposing a more democratic system for decision making of the Poh protocol and that it is not ultimately subordinated to a DAO that has a high concentration (15 Wallets >51% of the votes, additionally a person can have more than 1 wallet). [^2]

That isn’t true, using a separate token will prevent mutualization of the security. The UBI marketcap is extremely low (0.5M) and attacks on it would be way easier than attacks on PNK.

@jfdominguez.eth

to value the UBI. Poh DAO seeks to give value and use to the UBI even when this may go against the value of the PNK.

The PoH DAO doesn’t own UBI. UBI is a project created by democracy earth owned by the UBI DAO, not PoH. UBI is one application of PoH, but far from the only one.

[littlestar]

@santisiri

last but not least, list of developers working on UBI & proof of humanity who are not on the kleros payroll from the top of my mind:

• santisiri
• juanumusic,
• alan donoso
• avsa
• nico bilinkis,
• ruben
• aztec (+ two other anons who work with him i can’t recall now)
• the yubiai folks

From what I know, the Yubiai folks are incubated and funded by Kleros.

@santisiri

• $1.2M in 2018 valuating each UBI at $1.25
• From the raise, Democracy Earth has invested it all in the R&D that led to the launch of UBI between 2018 and 2021 which includes projects with the Ethereum ecosystem (eg. MolochDAO smart contract), implementation of pilots (eg. Quadratic Voting in Colorado in collaboration with Glen Weyl et al.), participation in conferences (eg. Devcon in Prague and Osaka where we met to brainstorm Proof of Hymanity) and published papers (eg. “Who Watches The Watchmen”)

Could you show us exactly what was built? Because I only see a paper and a token contract (and even for the token contract, it looks like Kleros handled the security part and the pools). So this doesn’t seem much for 1.2M$.

[rip]

I find it hilarious all the comments about the Kleros governance being potentially against PoH, meanwhile the reality is this:

KIP-51 PNK Airdrop to PoH users

The goals of PoH & Kleros are aligned, but it appears greedy people want to give utility to $UBI by taking the utility of PNK.

[ludovico]

How in any reality a PNK airdrop is “being aligned”? Please explain.

[jfdominguez.eth]

@littlestar

From what I know, the Yubiai folks are incubated and funded by Kleros.

The Yubiai project came alive as an evolution of UBIP2P telegram group, there were many people working with them, and the whole community participated in choosing YUBIAI as the name. Could you please clarify the date they started the Kleros incubator program with them?

[rip]

How is it against? It would allow PoH registrants to stake on the humanity court.
Can’t believe I have to even spell this out.

[jfdominguez.eth]

@clesaege thanks for take the time for answer me.
Some other reflexions from my side:

@clesaege

@jfdominguez.eth

The interests of Kleros DAO and Poh DAO are not 100% the same, they may have points of alignment, but while Kleros seeks to give value to the PNK and in case this is aligned with that objective, to value the UBI. Poh DAO seeks to give value and use to the UBI even when this may go against the value of the PNK.

PoH paid a total of 10 000$ to jurors, that is less than 1$ per registration. Putting UBI as a staking token will not significantly increase UBI price.

That amount was paid by individual people, not by Poh. In your view is like the registrant´s errors paid for the whole registry. Maybe I misexpressed myself, the motivation is not UBI price, is to have a diverse registry, also baing the first experience in crypto for people who needs help and not risking big amounts on jurors.

@clesaege

@jfdominguez.eth

Because the Kleros whitepaper [^1] contemplates it as an alternative, and it is even described as an attribute.

The fork explained in the whitepaper is forking in case of malicious decision removing the stake of malicious parties, not greedy forks (removing PNK to put another token).
A greedy fork has already been tried by Aragon and it failed. Making a Kleros copy isn’t that easy.

Maybe was an interpretation mistake, but calling “greedy” only because you don´t understand the motivation is one of the things that make me think we are not really aligned. If you think this is about greed or money you are not listening enough to the community.

@clesaege

@jfdominguez.eth

Poh DAO and Kleros DAO interests are not 100% aligned.

Can you give an example of that? If you are talking about the 10k$ of juror fees (pre-gas, so actual payouts if you count gas spent by jurors and the value of their time is way lower), this is negligible compared to the value that Kleros brings, including the creation and maintenance of the whole system.

We are not discussing the value of Kleros to the project, no one can dispute that. From my point of view, I hope that both projects continue to collaborate and find more aligned interests. As I mentioned in the first point, I believe that Kleros has as its objective the valorization of the PNK, by different means, including creating a single registry of humans. If there is a case of decisions of Poh´s DAO in which it may harm the value of the PNK, the incentives are not aligned.
What I expect from Poh´s DAO is that it has an inclusive, economic, democratic registry of unique humans, that gives opportunities to those who do not have the money and the initial knowledge, that they do not feel challenged and that be governed 100% by their own community until the last instance, even if that goes against the value of PNK

@clesaege

@jfdominguez.eth

Kleros has been applying iurispositivism in its courts, and in many cases interpretive attitudes were seen to benefit the number of cases in dispute. Putting unintentional errors, UI errors with attacks to the system at the same level. (352p, black bars) or even delaying their correction. This not only discourages the participation of new jurors but also leaves a large part of the population out of the registry.

This has nothing to do with Kleros. Kleros is fine even without disputes from PoH. The challenger ecosystem on the other hand is not. Keep in mind that 80% of lost deposits goes to challengers, only 20% goes to Kleros jurors.
The dispute rate is very low at 4%. This means that PoH pays less than 1$ per registration to Kleros jurors.

Again, this money is not being paid by PoH is being paid by humans trying to register in a registry, maybe your role requires you to see the big picture and big figures, but we are talking about humans doing this. A big part of the people from the DAO I’m talking to, works hard every day for free, mostly because they believe in this project as a meaningful project for people´s wellness, bringing new people to the ecosystem, and creating technology to solve people´s needs.

@clesaege

@jfdominguez.eth

Kleros is OK with the autonomy of PoH DAO as long as it is aligned with its objectives, in the gov blog Clement commnt "The largest UBI wallet belongs to the cooperative with 2.1M UBI (we removed those from the pool for transparency). " [^4] shows that at the slightest will of independence Kleros will show its verticality and will generate FUD (Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt) both in the Kleros community and in the Poh community.

Which FUD? I just corrected the info that Vitalik was the largest holder while the coop is the largest holder.

The following quotations from your reply answer your question

@clesaege

A greedy fork has already been tried by Aragon and it failed. Making a Kleros copy isn’t that easy.

@clesaege

That isn’t true, using a separate token will prevent mutualization of the security. The UBI marketcap is extremely low (0.5M) and attacks on it would be way easier than attacks on PNK.

Answering FUD question.

@clesaege

@jfdominguez.eth

to value the UBI. Poh DAO seeks to give value and use to the UBI even when this may go against the value of the PNK.

The PoH DAO doesn’t own UBI. UBI is a project created by democracy earth owned by the UBI DAO, not PoH. UBI is one application of PoH, but far from the only one.

It´s not the value generated for the Poh´s DAO, is the value generated to the humans registered on Poh

[santisiri]

@littlestar

Could you show us exactly what was built? Because I only see a paper and a token contract (and even for the token contract, it looks like Kleros handled the security part and the pools). So this doesn’t seem much for 1.2M$.

The examples mentioned on my reply can be googled so you get a sense of what they are about, that’s why I included them. There’s obviously way more than that, you can check http://paper.democracy.earth to see the many avenues that where explored during that time to pursuit our goals.

We have made a paper that details the pilots we held in places like Hong Kong, Colombia, Colorado and with other web3 companies like Blockstack. You may find it here: http://www.dropbox.com/s/wzf7n7n5fhf09zx/Democracy%20Earth%20Pilots%20Report.pdf?dl=0 … The pilots helped us understand how to do elections using blockchain, different models of democracy that make sense according to specific contexts and identifying the core aspect to solve: identity.

Things might seem obvious today, but they weren’t back in 2018. If you enjoy voting democratically with Proof of Humanity, we do too and take pride in the fact this is indeed the most democratic DAO in Ethereum. How to achieve this was not clear at all back then.

Kleros audited and helped polish the UBI contracts, it’s usually good practice to have external entities do that. Fun story: Clement was decidedly against the UBI token being able to stream due to security concerns, we ended up implementing that nonetheless in order to prioritize gas saving for users. Today that has become the most salient feature of UBI and it’s core to UBI v2. No security issues around the streaming feature where reported in 1.5 years so far.

1.2M in the context of the 2017/2018 bubble was actually a small raise and we didn’t do an ICO or stuff like that since it was a regulated offering in the US, keep in mind we are a Californian company. Democracy Earth had a team of 6 full time engineers / product managers / researchers employed in New York and San Francisco plus more than 100 volunteers from different cities around the world that helped us implement the pilots we held. If you get a sense what are the market rates to hire engineers there, you’d realize we did a good job.

Today, our former employees work for Wikipedia, Open Collective, RadicalXChange and other similar organizations very much in line with Democracy Earth. The influence we had online regarding how to achieve democracy on the internet must not be understated and we are definitely responsible for bringing the vast majority of users to Proof of Humanity.

[juanu]

@jfdominguez.eth

Poh DAO está en un momento de crecimiento, donde quiere y necesita poder tomar decisiones que estén cada vez mas alineadas con sus objetivos y no tener una coop como Kleros con la última palabra sobre su autonomía.

Esto es una falacia. La DAO tiene autonomia ya que es votada por los miembros (registrados humano). Kleros no forma parte de las decisiones tomadas por la DAO.

[santisiri]

@juanu

Esto es una falacia. La DAO tiene autonomia ya que es votada por los meembros (registrados humano). Kleros no forma parte de las decisiones tomadas por la DAO.

Coincido. Esta crisis comienza sin embargo con el statement de que los canales de chat en los que la comunidad invirtió su tiempo para ayudar a la gente y atender sus necesidades, fueron repentinamente declarados propiedad de la Coop. De ahí que ahora la DAO está buscando certezas respecto a que le pertenece y que no… creo que esto en sí es muy saludable para todos.

[juanu]

@santisiri

Coincido. Esta crisis comienza sin embargo con el statement de que los canales de chat en los que la comunidad invirtió su tiempo para ayudar a la gente y atender sus necesidades, fueron repentinamente declarados propiedad de la Coop. De ahí que ahora la DAO está buscando certezas respecto a que le pertenece y que no… creo que esto en sí es muy saludable para todos.

coincido también, pero es importante educar a quienes no tienen un completo entendimiento de los procesos de toma de decisiones y sus actores. Creo que es uno de los mayores problemas que tiene hoy la DAO.

Hay una gran mayoría de usuarios que tienen una visión positiva para el cambio, que apoyan esta HIP, pero no tienen un entendimiento pleno de como funciona todo internamente, por lo que votan o hacen afirmaciones que creen entender al 100%, cuando la realidad es otra.

Por esto hago hincapié en que para avanzar con esta HIP (la cual QUIERO apoyar) se requiere mucho trabajo de investigación y entendimiento, de mecánicas de incentivos y protocolos, no solo decir “si, nos vamos de Keros”.

La propuesta debe llegar con mejoras, tanto desde el lado tecnico de implementacion, como desde el lado pedagogico. Los miembros que votan deben aprender y entender que estan votando. No solo por que “si tiene sentido” , sino desde el lado de saber cual es el impacto.

[s-p-k-y.eth]

@jfdominguez.eth

The interests of Kleros DAO and Poh DAO are not 100% the same, they may have points of alignment, but while Kleros seeks to give value to the PNK and in case this is aligned with that objective, to value the UBI. Poh DAO seeks to give value and use to the UBI even when this may go against the value of the PNK.

There is a confusion about the separation of daos. PoH dao should work towards the secure and affordable running of PoH. UBI dao is working towards fair value and distribution of ubi. Kleros works towards the secure operation of the court and the value of their tokens. These are separate daos and there may be occasions where they are conflicting, can’t we imagine the pursuit of ubi value could also be in conflict with poh in the same way we imagine pnk to be?

We could even make another dao with another new token with an even fairer distribution without initial funding presales from democracy earth! Surely this would then be the best token for an independent court without external organisational pressures? But see, we start to fall into conspiratorial language, describing patriotic independent sovereignty than can never be satisfied.

There are conflicting pressures however we move and we should accept that. There is no purity we will find. We are inter-dependent and should rally around our shared goals and reliance on one another. Kleros court works fine imo. The idea of having backup processes in place and an ability to fork all aspects when needed could be useful.

But jumping straight into breaking connections and replacing the court under the guise of fairness (when unfairness hasn’t really been demonstrated), independence (when we just become dependant on something else), and ubi token(when we could launch any other token on top of poh and it could also have fair claim to this) seems misguided.

[santisiri]

I definitely don’t want Proof of Humanity DAO to break any ties with Kleros, I’m not interested in that at all and hopefully the fact that I voted in support of @clesaege in HIP 48 is a testament to that considering the fact that my vote alone with its delegations had the choice to condemn him.

I agree with @juanu that any change that implies using changeArbitrator (which is still a legitimate use of the smart contract) should be severely tested with deployed proof of concepts on testnets. I wouldn’t support this HIP moving forward without that as well. At the same time, there’s nothing wrong on proposing using this function and everyone in this community has a right to propose alternative uses of it.

As @s-p-k-y.eth says there’s much to gain from PoH, UBI and Kleros working together. But until this crisis, the boundaries between each project weren’t clear to many. This lengthy debate should help clarify those so we can move forward with a more clear understanding by the community as a whole on how things work and what is possible / not possible.

Again, I don’t view this as a bad situation but rather quite the contrary, something that will lead to a more solid project and community as a whole.

[s-p-k-y.eth]

@santisiri

Again, I don’t view this as a bad situation but rather quite the contrary, something that will lead to a more solid project and community as a whole.

Agreed! It’s exciting and energising when debate stirs up and people start to voice their thoughts.

Even though I don’t think this should happen I’m glad people are thinking about how it could happen and when it should happen. And making preparations and test to see what is possible. Having people ready and aware to fork is a very good thing. (I’m actually surprised we don’t see more community forks across the eth ecosystem, there’s a lot of cloned contracts but it’s rare things happen from within). As PoH gets more humans things will become more difficult and complex and opinionated. That’s great, it’s human.

This thread is very healthy and needed.

[clesaege]

@jfdominguez.eth

@clesaege

PoH paid a total of 10 000$ to jurors, that is less than 1$ per registration. Putting UBI as a staking token will not significantly increase UBI price.

That amount was paid by individual people, not by Poh. In your view is like the registrant´s errors paid for the whole registry. Maybe I misexpressed myself, the motivation is not UBI price, is to have a diverse registry, also baing the first experience in crypto for people who needs help and not risking big amounts on jurors.

Sure, in the current design, individuals who are rejected pays for the security of the registry (maintaining a healthy challenger ecosystem).
Actually when we started studying systems like TCR, we were scarred that there wouldn’t be enough rejections to incentivize a challenger ecosystem and with the guys of Truebit studied the concept of forced errors:
Put wrong submissions on purpose in order to incentivize a challenger ecosystem. Note that in the context of PoH it would require some fees from participants even when submissions are accepted.

However we found out that we didn’t even need forced errors, as people being humans made errors without even being asked, so the challenger ecosystem ending up being funded without any forced error scheme.

We could discuss introducing a registration fee and forced errors while relaxing the policy strictness. But note that it would result in a higher average cost per user.

Note that none of this is dependent of the arbitrator.

@jfdominguez.eth

Maybe was an interpretation mistake, but calling “greedy” only because you don´t understand the motivation is one of the things that make me think we are not really aligned. If you think this is about greed or money you are not listening enough to the community.

A “greedy fork” is a fork where someone replace one token with his own. That is the term we used when discussing the Aragon fork and it is made to contrast with regular forks (like ETH with ETC, BTC with BCH or Kleros forks described in the whitepaper).

@jfdominguez.eth

As I mentioned in the first point, I believe that Kleros has as its objective the valorization of the PNK

So if someone wants to put the UBI token it’s not for the price, but if someone wants to keep PNK (which funded the project) it’s because of wanting to increase its price. I don’t get this double standard.

@jfdominguez.eth

Again, this money is not being paid by PoH is being paid by humans trying to register in a registry

Humans (or fake humans who will fail registration) pays Proof Of Humanity which in turn pays jurors (20%) and challengers (80%).
I understand that people do not like much losing money, but it is necessary for someone to pay for the challenger ecosystem. Otherwise people would attack it and PoH would be useless. Seeing that some large scale farming has gone undetected for sometime, I’m not even sure that the challenger ecosystem is enough incentivized.
Even people who fail their first registration ends up net positive just with the UBI they get (180$ over the 2 years registration period while the lost deposit is 130$). Note that gas fees may change that, but with V2, gas fees should become negligible (and deposits would also lower).
A way to increase the net profit of registered humans would be to increase what is given to registered humans like having them getting more airdrops.
Lowering security would make the registry less attractive, thus less likely to be used to receive airdrops.

@jfdominguez.eth

@clesaege

That isn’t true, using a separate token will prevent mutualization of the security. The UBI marketcap is extremely low (0.5M) and attacks on it would be way easier than attacks on PNK.

Answering FUD question.

This isn’t FUD. This is discussing security concerns and arguing that PoH currently benefits from mutualized economic security and removing that would make it less secure.

[fnanni]

@jfdominguez.eth

What we are talking about is to have the Arbitrator and Governor full aligned to Poh DAO, we are not talking about one case or one court neither about @ludovico wills.

“Whoever controls the courts, controls the state”. Aristotle. This is how Kleros white paper introduction starts. Personally I want a court controlled by diverse humans with alligned interesses and not by 10-15 wallets with some other motivations.

I wish a inclusive register where attaks and mistakes are not trated as the same, and the answer “you allways can change the rules” is what started this HIP.

My hypothesis is that the UBI courts will still be “plutocratic”, fewer than you think will participate (because of min stake and interest for example), there will be whales in the court, total stake is going to be low in comparison to Kleros and thus it will be more attackable, you will still see rulings you don’t like, you will find yourself saying “you can always change the rules or stake” to people mad about a ruling and the courts will still have some problems which Kleros has (but is improving for Kleros v2). It seems to me that what you expressed in your replies is mostly wishful thinking. Could you answer the 4 questions I made in my last reply?

On the other hand, PoH has a problem with farmers. Do you think farmers’ incentives are aligned with your interests? Do you worry about farmers controlling the courts? Today it seems that it takes around 1k humans to do a 51% governance attack to PoH. Let’s say an influencer with 1M followers decides to attempt to break PoH and the UBI courts by mobilizing their fans. Do you think this could be possible? What defenses have both systems against this?