HIP: 60
title: Removal of Justin Kalland of the Mission Board
author: Ludoviko.eth
status: Phase 2
created: 2022-06-25
updated:2022-09-06
Simple Summary
This HIP proposes to remove the Mission Board Member Justin Kalland of the Mission Board, in order to call for elections to a functioning and present mission board member.
Abstract
The current state of affairs requires an uneven set of Mission Board Members (MBM) in order to prevent the DAO stalling over a balanced 2 vs 2 scenario. The proposal is to remove the MBM Justin Kalland, which allow the DAO to call a new Election.
Motivation
Justin Kalland has done a great work advocating for the DAO. Unfortunately, he was unreachable for a long time over his social media accounts and personal messengers. This brings some critical decisions of the Mission Board to the risk of being stalled due to a tie. For example as of today, the interim rules of the Spanish Kleros-backed Group states that “a tie is sufficient to remove a mod” which is not an ideal situation given the current conformation of the Board.
A first draft of this HIP was posted in June 2022, and there was a commitment from Justin at the time to resume his activities, but unfortunately we haven’t heard of him since.
Specification
(Required for Phase 2)
The technical specification should describe the syntax and semantics of any new feature. The specification should be detailed enough to allow for it to be reasoned about by participants in the PoH DAO.
Rationale
(Recommended for Phase 2)
The rationale fleshes out the specification by describing what motivated the design and why particular design decisions were made. It should describe alternate designs that were considered and related work. The rationale may also provide evidence of consensus within the community, and should discuss important objections or concerns raised during discussion.
Shouldn’t we go even further and create a HIP that puts some rules for the MBM?
Something like a few well agreed minimum acts that in case that are not accomplished, a more transparent removal can occur?
I understand the need for more rules regarding MB permanence. Those will take time, and this issue has been hanging for months. Feel free to kickstart that particular discussion. I will proceed with this one.
Did Justin indicate that he would not be present if there was a tie? I believe he was active the last time we needed his input.
I believe it’s important to say that the MB HIP did not specify that the MB should be active in the groups, for example. If we want that, then it’s a good idea to add that in the description of the role. MBs are not community managers.
Other MBs were even more inactive than Justin, and that was not a reason for requesting their removal, so this seems a bit arbitrary.
That said, I would love him to come back, has anyone tried to contact him lately?
I have tried to reach out to @Justin via Signal and Telegram. He appeared during our “democratic summer” to vote… but haven’t heard back from him recently.
I tend to agree with @clesaege that it’s probably better to have a standard mechanism in place rather than an ad hoc solution to this kind of situation.
Let MB members vote whether if a member is to be considered inactive.
If the MB is obviously not active, yet the MB confabulates to kick them out, it’s still considered part of the MB.
If any, the last thing you want to give a mission board is to decide the entrance, permanence or leave of another member of the board. These are DAO voted officials, so the DAO by the power of collective will should decide.
Alright, make it an HIP so that any MB member can call for a vote of kicking a MB due to being inactive (with some proof).
And it’s a vote that can be created straight to Binding stage in snapshot
Because then anyone can go and spam [Binding] votes. The rationale behind making it a different process is prevent having to do a whole HIP process per inactive removal.
So? Let them spam those votes, fwiw an mb member can do that as well… are you familiar with the concept of checks and balances? Separation of powers - Wikipedia
The MB should not have veto power over itself. It’s basic governance design 101.
