Implement a Pigovian tax on idle vouchers. The tax will progressively decrease the human’s drip rate, based on the formula, over a period of time, until it hits zero or a minimum. Humans can work their way back to the average rate over time by increasing their vouching activity.
The tax rate should reflect the following variables:
Number of users onboarded to the registry
As humans onboarded to the registry increase the protocol’s opportunity cost of idle participants decrease
Vouchers held
Length held
Benefits:
Increase registry growth rate
Isolates a target demographic of users that highly value UBI to become active ambassadors.
Decreases UBI inflation by disincentivizing idleness
Promotes citizens of the registry to be unselfish
Promotes usage of Vouchers Marketplace
Cons:
Creates information asymmetry in what the basic/average income is
Creates complexity for idle users that want to reach the average income by increasing their vouching activity
Sort of an Idle Vouch “incentive” if for some reason, we wanted to adjust? maybe this is a sliding community driven set of values depending on the desired end result?
Hi Scott, thank you for taking the time to create and submit these proposals. I am - - in Telegram, I have read the doc you shared and I am happy to see this here.
I like this one, just wondering what will happen after some time being registered on the platform. It seems it is important to vouch only people you met before. So it can happen that someone stops vouching because there are no people left they met in real life to be vouched, or on the other hand, this pigovian tax could force users to vouch anyone they dont know just to keep the rate.
Maybe a negative exponential curve can be used (https://miro.medium.com/max/2400/0*4gY0IMow_8DeHCXV -the bottom left curve-), forcing new users to vouch a lot at the beginning (assuming they will onboard more people), but flattening the curve after some time.
What do you think? Correct me if I am wrong or the pigovian tax already contemplates this. Thank you.
Yes, I think a negative exponential curve is a great idea because it reflects the opportunity costs of idle members. As more users onboard then the penalty of idle vouchers should decrease too. This won’t become a factor until the registry hits a few hundred million people so it doesn’t need to be in the first implementation.
Yes, you are right, the issuance is actually quite perfect because it is so predictable and easy to understand. Following the same simple rule as long as possible will help a stable valuation and thereby stable income. The argument to change it has to be strong indeed.