PoH Origin Constitution v2

We would like to present a new draft of the Constitution for Proof of Humanity Origin, which was based on the first version proposed by shotaro.eth.

The purpose of this post is to explain the rationale of the amendments, and gather community feedback.

Rationale of the Amendments to the Constitution of PoH Origin

The following changes have been made to the proposed Constitution for PoH Origin:

Section 2: We removed the detailed list of discrimination types to avoid debates over its completeness and the necessity to enumerate every possible discrimination basis. Discrimination is now defined as any differentiation that is “arbitrary” and lacks a valid constitutional justification (e.g., banning niqabs is not arbitrary because allowing them would jeopardize the protocol’s sybil resistance, which is a constitutional principle/goal).

Section 4: We introduced a security principle to protect against governance attacks and proposals that threaten the protocol’s security or PoH’s treasury. Proposals must not pose a clear and demonstrable security risk to the PoH DAO, its treasury, or its users. Proposals should not be rejected for uncertain security risks or common industry-related risks, such as investing in risky DeFi strategies, unless they are flagged as governance attacks.

Section 5.c: The Kleros governor has been replaced with Kleros SafeSnap. This change allows anyone to submit a Snapshot proposal that requires on-chain execution with the transaction details preset in the same interface. If the proposal passes, it can be executed directly within the Snapshot UI, streamlining the execution process while maintaining its decentralized nature. A minimum bond of 4 ETH in Reality.eth is required to deter malicious proposals and secure PoH. If the executed transaction deviates from the approved proposal (e.g., a proposal to invest 10K but the transaction is for 20K) or violates the Constitution, it can be challenged in Reality and ultimately submitted to Kleros Courts for arbitration. Kleros will serve as the judicial authority of PoH, ensuring checks, balances, and decentralized enforcement of the Constitution. More about Kleros SafeSnap here: Kleros x Gnosis SafeSnap: How the Open DeFi DAO decentralizes its governance

Section 5.d.i: We clarified and standardized voting periods by changing references from “months” to “days” to ensure consistency (e.g., a proposal starting on Feb 1 and ending on Mar 1 would have fewer days than one starting on Jul 1). To avoid confusion about the length of a month, we also define challenge periods in days.
When setting the challenge period of the Kleros Curate registry of constitutional proposals using the Kleros front-end, one must take into account that this challenge period is measured in “hours”. It must be assumed that one day equals 24 hours, making the challenge period for regular HIPs 168 hours and 720 hours for constitutional amendments HIPs.

Additionally, we introduced a 3-day challenge period in Reality for proposals requiring on-chain execution.

Section 5.d.iii: We expanded the “logically sound” requirement to include:

  • English Language Requirement: To prevent coherence issues and translation disputes, English will be the authoritative language in case of inconsistencies. While proposals can be in multiple languages to accommodate non-English speakers, the English version will prevail in the event of any conflict.
  • Specification: Proposals must be detailed enough to ensure effective execution. They should clearly outline the exact changes to maintain transparency, allow voters to understand the implications, and enhance efficiency.

Section 5.d.vi: We removed the rule that deemed proposals failing the constitutional check as treason, which banned submitters from future proposals and holding office. Recognizing that constitutional debates can arise and errors can occur while drafting proposals (e.g., logical inconsistencies), we believe that losing the 4 ETH deposit is a sufficient penalty to deter malicious proposals without resorting to extreme measures like expulsion from PoH.

Section 5.e: Inspired by HIP 34, this new clause addresses potential issues with the voting platform by establishing a structured, democratic process for selecting a new one. It also safeguards against censorship and potential coup d’état scenarios, such as an admin going rogue, maliciously modifying voting parameters, or censoring proposals.
It also recognizes the use of an official forum. We believe this is desirable to nucleate proposal discussions. While members can still discuss PoH in other spaces, an official forum makes it easier for everyone to stay informed about ongoing matters.

Additionally, in the event of a permanent issue with the voting platform or a coup, an official forum prevents fragmentation of proposals across different platforms. This ensures that members are aware of all proposals to select a new voting platform, avoiding scenarios where a new voting platform gains majority support simply due to lack of awareness.

One of the first HIPs would be to establish the “official forum”. That proposal could also outline a rule that would state that if the official forum experiences a permanent issue or an attack, a new forum space must be selected. If both the forum and the voting platform are unavailable, members should follow the process outlined in section 5.e of the Constitution, and the “official forum” should be considered any platform where the majority of members can be notified (i.e. PoH Telegram group). This would be necessary for the unlikely but possible event that both the voting platform and the forum are attacked, making the notification required by section 5.e impossible to implement.

Minor Clarity Adjustments: We made various minor changes for clarity, including abbreviations (e.g., “PoH”), standardizing terms, and refining wording.

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