[phase 1] HIP 48: Removal of Clement Lesaege as mission board member

Past behavior is not indicative of future behavior, especially when given startup attains status of the incumbent (Twitter, Uber, Google, …). Web3 premise is not “Don’t be evil”, but “Can’t be evil” and all designs should be done with that idea in the back of your head. While a registry of a few thousand users might not be significant, a couple million is an equivalent of a small country. I can’t imagine it being managed by a few dozen people, as it currently is. Unless you plan to continuously airdrop PNK to people to balance the power, this solution seems no less centralized than Facebook.

Since you seem to like philosophy, why do you think post-revolutionary French and American courts have introduced trials by jury made of citizens and not private corporation? Which side of revolution do you think you’re on?

Note that, I don’t have any issue with Kleros offering insurance, escrow services, etc to willing private parties, but PoH is orders of magnitudes bigger than that and too important to allow few dozen unelected people have the last word, hence censorship-resistance is equally serious matter as sybil-resistance, but it seems to be ignored by your team. Clement considers majority of people, who voted against HIP-55 pretty much unaligned with the sybil-resistance basis of the protocol, but at the same time ignores much more dangerous loss of censorship-resistance. This speaks more about his narrow-mindedness, short-sightedness or power lust than anything else, and IMO, is sufficient ground for vote of non-confidence or whatever it’s called.

Worst case scenario is: If a majority of stake is controlled by incumbents, as it currently seems to be), then eventually large enough appeal (group size) will lock-in the result desired by majority of PNK stake, which is not the same as PoH stake.

Same reason why Eth switched to PoS after 10% of all eth was staked. That’s why I’ve suggested 1mln people limit to switch governance / court mechanism in other topic or burning UBI with vouches to rate-limit attacker and incur economic cost. Burn per vouch may be a function of current per-case market price, so if UBI is very cheap, less people will be onboarding, since most juries will adjust their case price by $ cost and not UBI quantity. Those who want to jump the line must pump UBI by buying it.

I don’t want to pretend that I’ve solved it, but UBI mechanics as unspent human-time within protocol offers more ambitious and fair tokenomics and could be integral part of PoH, just like eth is in the ethereum blockchain. UBI-based ideas challenge Kleros (PNK) position, but they’re evolution in the right direction and if executed well - way more scalable than having to buy into a “private court corp”.

Facebook or Twitter produce wrong moderation decisions all the time, yet they don’t seem to care. Kleros may still output fair decisions in business-oriented courts, because this is where the money is, while being corrupted in PoH cases. Once enough people depend on something, it’s costly to move away, so people tend to develop stockholm syndrome and learn to live with it.

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