I’d appreciate an answer about this @0xjean.eth 
Regarding the who said who; who did what; who felt what; quite frankly it’s a pointless conversation. Of course I wish Kleros was more open to criticism. Of course you wish I spoke with a supposed neutrality. The good thing is that we are a democracy and we get to vote things.
I am going to vote NO on this HIP (Phase-2) as it will not contribute to deepening the rift in the community.
I will also push for the removal of MB’s position.
Unslahed Finance, Omen, API3, Etherscan, 1Inch, and while I’m at it here’s the full ecosystem page. Kleros is trusted by a number of important partners for its secure dispute resolution, and PoH has been and is being integrated for it’s Sybil-resistant properties. Sure, a fork can exist that points to an arbitrator that’s “for the people by the people”, but it’ll likely not be as Sybil-resistant given that the ones likely to side with this fork voted against explicit Sybil-resistance.
Sorry to burst your bubble but that’s how incentives work:
Anyone can stake to participate as a juror → jurors expect a reward for adjudicating disputes → more court usage = more jurors → more jurors = more security → more security = more partnerships and integrations.
Don’t let WAGMI Twitter culture fool you, Web3 is a business landscape at the end of the day and every protocol protects their interests in one way or another. As the DevRel of Kleros I value ecosystem growth, adoption of the ERC-792 Arbitration standard, and protocol security, and in the event of a fork I’ll be putting all my efforts to the side that shares these values.
What you call “value extraction” and “parasitical structure” is the exact game theoretic model that allows PoH to maintain Sybil-resistance in a decentralised way, did you expect Sybil-resistance to be achieved through honesty and good actors? If you had any ideas for a better model, then you could’ve reached out to William or signalled some intent on Kleros or PoH channels to work on/research new prototype.
Apologies for having no filter with this reply, but what I see far too often in the PoH community is loud mouths with lots of complaints and ideals for how things should be without any effort put to actually contributing.
Those few dozen cases on ethereum outside PoH? Still, feels more like LARPing, but that’s ok - it’s a proof that Kleros should have no reason to cling too much to PoH as a revenue source.
The only reason many people signed-up to PoH and not WorldCoin or BrightID, was that it was meant to be “decentralized”, which means that it’s mainly driven by smart-contracts and little left governance is democratic. If the whole structure depends on a court that doesn’t decentralize in the same way as the rest of the protocol, it’s not fulfilling its promise.
I don’t understand, why would you be implying that such court cannot be sybil-resistant and maintain economic incentives. I think the main point is that Kleros will never be willing to explore solutions that don’t require PNK and even then (famous PoHv2), they’ll surely place some backdoor and call it “supreme court” just to maintain price-action of PNK. Can’t you see that based on economic incentives, Kleros team is pretty much compromised?
Your imagination runs wild, I see, so you’re making a lot of assumptions on how my bubble works. The incentive game to maintain the registry clean doesn’t require centralized court - this is the only thesis. I’ve never claimed we should sing kumbaya and delude ourselves.
Simple idea:
Should be enough to have American-style court system, where registered humans become equal jurors, and no one has to buy PNK to be economically incentivized to do the right thing.
Spam vouching can be suppressed by requiring some sacrifice (burn) on behalf of voucher, e.g. 2 weeks of UBI. Any attacks would be costly and pump UBI, while honest users can still register other people, but in rate-limited fashion.
Bullshit. As I’ve said before, incentives can be there. You simply have a very narrow perspective, likely because of your bags. What you’re missing is that centralized court (PNK distribution) is way worse to sybil-resistance and PoH legitimacy long-term.
The idea to remove whole clusters of people, because they seem like “puppets” is a reason enough that kleros shouldn’t be trusted. UBI is a better economic protection than anything you’ve imagined, because even at $100 a year, people are less willing to record videos of themselves on someone else behalf, while Kleros is completely broken - arbitrary removals by decision of PNK holders without any hard proof.
Yeah, as I’ve mentioned before, I’m just a person on the sidelines sharing their perspective and I don’t care as much, so I think you should just swallow it without harassment or bringing argument from authority, because you’re building it or something - I simply don’t care.
As much as you, I’m not running a charity here, but at the same time I won’t be manipulated into propping up a protocol that isn’t as decentralized as it promises to be. Don’t think of yourself too much - neither PoH nor Kleros are original ideas (Vitalik mentioned it many times since 2014), and it seems that Kleros is just a remnant of ICO bubble. Just because you were first, doesn’t mean you’ll be the last.
History plays-out a lot faster in crypto.
You keep abusing the author tag to do politics. Author is for the one that writes the proposal, not to sign a letter.
I won’t interact with @ptaq.eth either because he’s being inflammatory and insulting other users.
If this proposal is suggesting that MB members need to be pristine due to some arbitrary metric, it’d be interesting to discuss:
The moment PoH was launched, and DAOified, it turned into everyone’s problem. You cannot blame Clement for “not fixing X” (talking about the metadata issue), but then take credit for everything else. If you want to take credit for everything, you need to take credit for the issues as well.
PoH was a DAO at the time, and it’s not Kleros responsibility to fix it. Since Luis was attentive enough to spot the issue, he should have fixed it himself. Instead, they turned gifts into political offenses. Projects launch with issues, deal with it. Don’t expect people to do your bidding, in open source you do things yourself, just like Nico did.
This one, like all arguments on this HIP, fall under three categories:
Under-specifying regulations (proposals about hiring, about creation of proposals) so that can be later interpreted as he unilaterally thinks.
Gerrymandering attempts by creating a set of 438 ethereum wallets that automatically delegated to him, even that up to this day, les than one third is registered or even an active member of the PoH community…
Not acknowledging the issues regarding the concentration and dominance of a priviledged few in the Kleros Humanity Court and not doing anything to prevent such an abnormal degree of centralization.
Over-reaching MBM authority by numerous attempts… (telegram stuff)
Going over the fact Santi summoned a MB vote to change how vp is counted:
I don’t feel like debunking your Gish gallop, and it’s not rational to do so due to Brandolini’s law. Since there’s no skin in the game whatsoever, it would be a waste of time.
Kleros is a for-profit DAO (i.e. a company) with PNK shareholder interests (pumpenomics)
Kleros is a DAO and the Kleros Cooperative develops the tech stack of kleros.
The cooperative is Incorporated in France as an “SCIC”, Cooperative society of collective interest. Democracy Earth (Santi Siri) is part of the cooperative. Clement is also part of the cooperative.
Before I started working on the Kleros tech stack, I joined the cooperative as a juror. Any jurors or users of Kleros can join the coop by filling out this form.
Regarding, xDAI - aren’t side chains out of fashion due to better security properties of L2s?
Not a single L2 is ‘decentralized.’ Whenever we use ‘decentralization’ it actually triggers me because we underspecify and use words like ‘democracy’ and ‘decentralization’ to win arguments without explanation.
What I mean here is that all L2s are upgradable proxy contracts, which means currently the L2s are permissioned multisigs. The sidechains provide, currently the same security guarantees as the rollups in their current state (to a first order approximation).
This is why the governor of Kleros and POH are more decentralized than a multisig, txns are disputable by a community,
I don’t see how it changes anything. Two separate entities - DAO and a non-profit, but highly interwoven with personnel. No matter how you muddy the waters, the DAO is for profit due to tokenomics and large PNK token-holders will exercise their powers in non-profit to protect that. The only feasible long-term solution is having PoH DAO contract some non-profit or other company to develop code and maintain infra for them based on specified needs, but vote budget each year - just like ENS does (and they don’t pay dividend nor have any revenue model!). No strings attached, exploitative hostage relationship, and no conflict of interests.
Temporarily due to heavy development - check L2BEAT – The state of the layer two ecosystem Even then, some L2s provide upgrade delay, so there is a way to exit before malicious upgrade is pushed. xDAI will never have that level of security, so it seems kind of pointless to invest in at this time. Still, it’s just solidity code, so it’s easy to migrate.
I’d really like to see my other points answered. I’m only using terms that describe patterns of behaviors and relationships from game-theoretic standpoint. Don’t take it personally.
I think the best path forward is a fork coinciding with the the launch of Proof of Humanity v2, one fork which you can launch. Proof of Humanity v1 will ossify and users will choose when they resubmit their registration after expiry which fork of Proof of Humanity v2 they want to participate in. Kleros can help by deploying the contracts and providing documentation how things work, and you can launch and found that version. Let’s continue this discussion in the fork thread.
One comment about forking, on the axis of ‘exit’ vs ‘voice’, these concepts are a false dichotomy. And forking represents simultaneously voice and exit, the two are not mutually exclusive. What we are doing here is using voice to coordinate ourselves to agree to disagree and go our separate ways. Its as if we are in an unhappy marriage and we don’t consider divorce because our society frowns upon it. Forking supports the idea of opt-in non-coercive systems.
Speaking as a child of divorce, many of us in the Proof of Humanity community and builders who love the vision of POH want to see it succeed are like kids in a marriage, we don’t want to see our parent’s split up, but sometimes everyone is happier with the freedom to associate and choose, especially in an abusive marriage. Being forced to stay in an abusive marriage is terrible. Why don’t we agree to split the house and the car ‘the treasury’ in half? It’s better for everyone involved to have a clean amicable divorce, no lawyers involved, no constant bickering and arguing.
Exit is a father leaving for a pack of cigarettes and never coming back.
Voice is constant bickering and arguing in an abusive marriage.
Forking is agreeing to disagree and face the reality of a dysfunctional marriage, and amicably separating. It doesn’t mean that each parent doesn’t still love it’s children, it’s better for everyone involved. It also doesn’t mean that the parents should immediately divorce without trying counseling or reconciliation, but seeing as Clement is being physically threatened and Santi feels harassed, we are at a point of no return. I’m sure that the distance of the fork/divorce may even allow the both Santi and Clement to have a function relationship and be around each other at conferences.
has serious accusations of corrupting his own protocol
Subjectivocracy solves this. Kleros v2 will support fork-friendliness. If there is an attacker on the court, the PNK token is currently a minime token which means it can be easily forked. In kleros v2, the process to coordinate the fork will be formalized to provide users a manner to fork the juror set (PNK holders) over the outcome of disputes.
On the specific case in question, 1170, Avraham Eisenberg, infamous for the $100 million draining of mango markets and fortress dao hacks, was attempting to drain capital from Unslashed finance, a dapp which uses Kleros to arbitrate disputes over insurance claims. Many jurors had conflicting opinions, some thought the claim was legitimate, and others saw the claim as illegitimate. In hindesight, given Avraham’s history abusing protocols, IMO, Avraham was attempting to manipulate Kleros and failed. In such a case where jurors believe strongly that Avraham’s claim is legitimate, jurors can fork where everyone who voted against the claim are removed from the fork.
This also works for POH cases. If there is a POH case which splits the community, a fork can be coordinated where jurors who accept a submission will join fork A and jurors who reject a submission will join fork B.
does not believe in decentralization
I am against abuse of these terms. Can we avoid the fallacious underspecification of ‘decentralization’ and ‘democracy’ and rhetorical prods to win arguments. Please lets specify what we mean (client diversity, multisig signer thresholds, staker concentration, etc).
After the act of intolerance that goes against every principle Ethereum stands for during my talk
Ethereum does stand for calling out false founders. See Vitalik here calling out Craig Wright for being a fraud for claiming to be the founder of Bitcoin in a conference. Principles of open-source software is giving credit where credit is due. As Vitalik writes in his newly published “Proof of Stake” book,
About a year ago at Deconomy** I publicly shouted down Craig Wright, a scammer claiming to be Satoshi Nakamoto, finishing my explanation of why the things he says make no sense with the question “Why is this fraud allowed to speak at this conference?”
Of course, Craig Wright’s partisans replied back with . . . accusations of censorship.
Did I try to “silence” Craig Wright? I would argue, no. One could argue that this is because “Deconomy is not a public space,” but I think the much better argument is that a conference is fundamentally different from an internet forum. An internet forum can actually try to be a fully neutral medium for discussion where anything goes; a conference, on the other hand, is by its very nature a highly curated list of presentations, allocating a limited number of speaking slots and actively channeling a large amount of attention to those lucky enough to get a chance to speak. A conference is an editorial act by the organizers, saying “here are some ideas and views that we think people really should be exposed to.” Every conference “censors” almost every viewpoint because there’s not enough space to give them all a chance to speak, and this is inherent in the format; so raising an objection to a conference’s judgment in making its selections is absolutely a legitimate act.
I don’t want to engage in Polemics, but for the record, Clement called you out for lying about being a founder of Proof of Humanity and claiming to have launched Proof of Humanity.
You made one commit on the Proof-of-Humanity repo. If that qualifies as launching Proof of Humanity, then Clement launched ERC-20. None of the developers and participants involved with the Proof of Humanity launch see you as a founder of Proof of Humanity or Democracy Earth as launching Proof of Humanity. Democracy Earth was the first integration. I won’t belabor this point and I don’t want to continue arguing over this topic.
I understand you spend lots of time advocating for Proof of Humanity to an extent that you feel ownership over Proof of Humanity. For many, you are the first point of contact on Proof Of Humanity. I applaud you for having used your platform and voice as a content creator with your podcast and interview sessions with other podcasts to speak about Proof of Humanity, which helped popularize Proof of Humanity. This is also important work.
To the degree that I have been involved in calculating and proposing parameter updates, I can tell you that the proposals have mostly responded to changes in gas prices. The average post-gas rewards for challengers and jurors taken by the calculators we use has generally not changed. The challenger reward and the juror fees in the Humanity court have historically been dominated by gas costs, and decreases in deposit size have largely been the result of recent declines in gas prices. (I can’t speak to what kinds of reasoning people might take when they vote for or against these proposals. Indeed, in a mature market for dispute resolution services it would be normal for people to want to adjust the price of the service to increase demand. However, that type of logic has not been used by the proposals that I have made.)
I could imagine some version of this working if you somehow managed to get a very large population on the list and actively participating in this. Absent that, the obvious strategy for an attacker that wants to influence outcomes is to try to gain weight by recruiting people whose profiles she either controls or that will side with her regardless of the underlying case. If the attacker got a high enough percentage of the participants she could even have them vote for artificially low fees to try to discourage honest participants and get them to leave. Then, whereas someone who buys up PNK to try to 51% attack Kleros inflicts an economic cost upon themself if PNK loses value because the attack causes the court to produce obviously wrong decisions, someone who tries to take over the court in this proposal doesn’t have to inflict an economic harm on themself beyond the effort required to recruit people. In contrast the security from the economic staking and the screens for proof-of-personhood planed for v2 are basically orthogonal, so that an attacker that wants to take over the system has to break both, making the system more robust. (See this talk I recently gave, particularly 8:38-14:00).
I think a lot of the tension in this community stems from the fact that there are challenges in getting the mechanism design to work well, particularly in the type of high gas environment we have had through most of PoH’s existence. It is regrettable these tensions seem to have become personal. I believe that basically everyone here, including Clément, just wants the protocol to succeed.
Wisest thing I’ve read on this very interesting thread so far. 
Past behavior is not indicative of future behavior, especially when given startup attains status of the incumbent (Twitter, Uber, Google, …). Web3 premise is not “Don’t be evil”, but “Can’t be evil” and all designs should be done with that idea in the back of your head. While a registry of a few thousand users might not be significant, a couple million is an equivalent of a small country. I can’t imagine it being managed by a few dozen people, as it currently is. Unless you plan to continuously airdrop PNK to people to balance the power, this solution seems no less centralized than Facebook.
Since you seem to like philosophy, why do you think post-revolutionary French and American courts have introduced trials by jury made of citizens and not private corporation? Which side of revolution do you think you’re on?
Note that, I don’t have any issue with Kleros offering insurance, escrow services, etc to willing private parties, but PoH is orders of magnitudes bigger than that and too important to allow few dozen unelected people have the last word, hence censorship-resistance is equally serious matter as sybil-resistance, but it seems to be ignored by your team. Clement considers majority of people, who voted against HIP-55 pretty much unaligned with the sybil-resistance basis of the protocol, but at the same time ignores much more dangerous loss of censorship-resistance. This speaks more about his narrow-mindedness, short-sightedness or power lust than anything else, and IMO, is sufficient ground for vote of non-confidence or whatever it’s called.
Worst case scenario is: If a majority of stake is controlled by incumbents, as it currently seems to be), then eventually large enough appeal (group size) will lock-in the result desired by majority of PNK stake, which is not the same as PoH stake.
Same reason why Eth switched to PoS after 10% of all eth was staked. That’s why I’ve suggested 1mln people limit to switch governance / court mechanism in other topic or burning UBI with vouches to rate-limit attacker and incur economic cost. Burn per vouch may be a function of current per-case market price, so if UBI is very cheap, less people will be onboarding, since most juries will adjust their case price by $ cost and not UBI quantity. Those who want to jump the line must pump UBI by buying it.
I don’t want to pretend that I’ve solved it, but UBI mechanics as unspent human-time within protocol offers more ambitious and fair tokenomics and could be integral part of PoH, just like eth is in the ethereum blockchain. UBI-based ideas challenge Kleros (PNK) position, but they’re evolution in the right direction and if executed well - way more scalable than having to buy into a “private court corp”.
Facebook or Twitter produce wrong moderation decisions all the time, yet they don’t seem to care. Kleros may still output fair decisions in business-oriented courts, because this is where the money is, while being corrupted in PoH cases. Once enough people depend on something, it’s costly to move away, so people tend to develop stockholm syndrome and learn to live with it.
Governments can force people to take part in juries or else face penalties such as fines or jail. (And nonetheless people tend to try to avoid having to serve on a jury.) So they have other tools that are not available to us to design robust systems and don’t need to rely so heavily on economic incentives. Maybe someday some version of PoH will be so important to enough people’s lives that the threat of being thrown off if people don’t do their “jury duty” will be an adequeate incentive to get them to participate, but that seems pretty far off.
I was wrong in previous post, regarding voluntary duty in U.S. - it’s seems they’re not voluntary, but in some cases, excusable.
I’m not sure now, if jury duty should be mandatory or voluntary. Voluntary jury duty could degenerate the system in subtler way than PNK staking will likely do in future (if not attempted already) - plutocracy manipulating voter pool with selective registry censorship, except indirectly - through cheap sybils undermining jury pricing and making it not worthwhile for the average person, as you’ve mentioned earlier. Alternative could be higher UBI rate for staking volunteers, but it breaks the idea of “unconditionality” of basic income.
A different perspective for mandatory jury duty would be that, UBI penalties could be a good (dis)incentive, so people would be forced to participate or face penalty, which could help self-regulate the system. Since the system offers basically free money and additional reward for jury participation, adding such contract between Humans and PoH could be seen as justifiable. Some exponential penalty increase for sequential jury skipping could force some people to participate in at least 1 of N cases. They could even turn account balance negative (0 UBI in wallet view + system debt) if there are more penalties than the current balance. People with insufficient UBI in their account should not be considered for jury duty. ETH PoS inactivity leak designs could serve as a good inspiration for future research.
So long as UBI has any value (needed for vouches, charities, voluntary taxations, etc), it would’ve worked to incentivize most, except very rich people, who’d would still mostly do it just for the sake of keeping good appearances. Expected number of cases per person yearly would still be be very small <1. If PoH registry doubles in size each year and there are 10% challenges, then given 3 jurors per case (currently it’s 1 due to gas issues), average Human in PoH should receive on average, only a single case every ~4 years (~25% draft chance each year). In many cases, there would still have to be a couple of rounds to find jury, because some people might ignore duty calls, but they should learn with time if there is good UX (notifications, emails, neat frontend).
Yeah, anything’s possible, but that doesn’t justify current design flaws (no rate-limiting, vouchallengers, etc) and need to hastly improvise a bad, censoring laws, like HIP-55, because you’ve started to lose elections. If this particular PoH DAO wants to explore this idea, there isn’t much you can do about it, except with reason.